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mfernandez2@worldbank.org.  Policy Re-  @mailexcite.com.  (24 pages)  structural  stability  ofmoney  demandfunc-
search Working  Papers  are also posted  on  tions; the behavior of money  demand  dur-
the Web at www.worldbank.org/research/  ing crises can be modeled by the same func-
workingpapers.  The authors  may be con-  2304. Disinflation  and  the  tion used during  periods of tranquility.  But
tacted  at  kdeininger@worldbank.org  or  Supply  Side  policymakers  should be aware that in some
polinto@worldbank.org.  (22 pages)  instances crises can give rise to variance in-
Pierre-Richard Agenor and Lodovico  Pizzati  stability in the price  or inflation  equations.
(March 2000)
2303.  Malaria  and  Growth
What role do supply-sidefactorsplay  in the  Martinez  Peria  empirically  investigates
F. Desmond McCarthy, Holger Wolf,  dynamics of output and absorption in ex-  the  monetary  impact  of banking  crises  in
and Yi Wu  change rate-based  stabilizationprograms?  Chile, Colombia,  Denmark,  Japan,  Kenya,
(March 2000)  Malaysia,  and  Uruguay.  She  uses
Ag6nor and Pizzati  study  the dynamics  of  cointegration  analysis  and  error  correc-
Malaria  ranks  among  the foremost  health  output,  consumption,  and real  wages  in-  tion modeling  to research:
problems  in tropical  countries.  Allowing  duced by a disinflation  program  based  on  *  Whether  money  demand  stability  is
for reverse causation,  malaria  is estimated  permanent  and  temporary  reductions  in  threatened  by banking  crises.
to reduce GDP  per capita growth rates by  the nominal  devaluation  rate.  *  Whether  crises  bring  about  struc-
at least a quarter percentage  point  a year  They  use  an intertemporal  optimizing  tural  breaks  in the  relationship  between
in many  Sub-Saharan  countries.  model  of a small  open  economy in which  monetary  indicators  and  prices.
domestic  households  face imperfect  world  Overall,  she  finds  no  systematic  evi-
McCarthy,  Wolf, and Wu explore the two-  capital markets,  the labor supply is endog-  dence  that  banking  crises  cause  money
sided link between  malaria  morbidity  and  enous,  and wages  are flexible.  demand  instability.  Nor  do  the  results
GDP per  capita  growth.  Climate  signifi-  The model predicts  that,  with a constant  consistently  support  the  notion  that  the
cantly affects cross-country  differences  in  capital  stock  and no investment,  there  is  relationship  between  monetary  indicators
malaria  morbidity.  Tropical location is not  an  initial  reduction  in  real  wages  and  and  prices  undergoes  structural  breaks
destiny,  however:  greater  access to rural  output  expands.  Consumption  falls  on  during  crises.  However,  although  indi-
health  care and  greater  income  equality  impact  but  increases  afterward.  vidual  coefficients  in  price  equations  do
are associated  with lower malaria  morbid-  In addition,  with  a temporary  shock, a  not seem  to be severely  affected by crises,
ity.  But the  interpretation  of this  link  is  current  account deficit emerges and, later,  crises can sometimes  give rise to variance
ambiguous:  does greater  income  equality  a recession  sets in, as documented  in vari-  instability  in price or inflation  equations.
allow for improved  anti-malaria  efforts, or  ous studies.  This  paper  - a  product  of  Finance,
does  malaria  itself  increase  income  in-  With endogenous  capital  accumulation,  Development  Research  Group  - is part
equality?  numerical  simulations  show  that  the  of a larger  effort  in  the  group  to study
Allowing  for  two-sided  causation,  model  can  also predict  a boom in invest-  banking  crises.  The study  was funded  by
McCarthy,  Wolf, and Wu find a significant  ment.  the  Bank's  Research  Support  Budget  un-Policy  Research  Working  Paper  Series  3
der the research project 'Monetary Policy  part of a larger effort in the group to study  scales.  Scales  in which each point is  labeled
and Monetary Indicators during Banking  the determinants  and policy  implications  may be more precise than numeric scales
Crises"  (RPO  683-24).  Copies  of  this paper  of  international financial contagion. Cop-  inwhichonly the endpoints  are labeled.  But
are available free from the World Bank,  ies ofthe paper are available free from the  responses are very sensitive to the exact
1818HStreet NW,  Washington,  DC 20433.  World  Bank, 1818  H StreetNW, Washing-  adjective chosen and it may be impossible
Please  contact  Agnes  Yaptenco, room  ton,  DC  20433.  Please  contact  Elena  to translate adjectives  precisely  across lan-
MC3-446, telephone  202-473-1823, fax  Mekhova, room MC9-622,  telephone 202-  guages, making it impossible to compare
202-522-1155, email address  ayaptenco  458-5984, fax 202-522-2031, email  ad-  responses across countries.
@worldbank.org.  Policy  Research  Working  dress  emekhova@worldbank.org. Policy  * Recognize that  the  share  of respon-
Papers are also posted  on the Web at www.  Research Working Papers are also posted  dents expressing opinions will be biased
worldbank.orgheearch/workingpapers.The  on  the  Web  at  www.worldbank.org/  upward if the  survey does not include a
author may  be contacted  at mmartinezperia  research/workingpapers.  Giovanni  middle ('indifferent" or 'don't know")  cat-
@worldbankorg.  (81 pages)  Majnoni may be contacted  at  gmajnoni  egory  and downward ifit does include the
@worldbank.org.  (34 pages)  middle category.
* When asking  degree-of-concern and
2306.  International  Contagion:  how-great-an-obstacle  questions, consider
Implications  for Policy  2307.  Surveying  Surveys  and  first asking a filter question (such as "Do
Questioning  Questions:  Learning  you believe this regulation is an obstacle
Roberto  Chang  and Giovanni  Majnoni  from  World  Bank  Experience  or not?").  Ifthe answer is yes, then ask how
(March  2000)  severe the obstacle is.
Francesca  Recanatini,  Scott  J. Walisten,  * Be aware  ofthe  effects  ofcontext.  The  act
What can the international community do  and Lixin  Cohn  Xu  of asking questions can affect  the answers
to  prevent financial contagion?  (March  2000)  given  on subsequent,  related questions.
* Think carefully about how to ask sen-
Chang and  Majnoni try  to identify and  How to make firm-level surveys more  con-  sitive questions.  Consider using a  self-
evaluate the public policy implications of  sistent,  yielding  data  more relevant  to  administered module for sensitive ques-
financial contagion on the basis of a very  policy analysis.  tions.  Alternatively,  a  randomized  re-
simple model of financial crises. In this  sponse mechanism may be a useful, truth-
model, financial contagion can be driven  The World Bank has increasingly focused  revealing mechanism.
by a combination of fundamentals and by  on firm-level surveys to build the  data  This paper - a product of Regulation
self-fulfilling market expectations.  foundation  needed  for accurate  policy  and  Competition  Policy,  Development
The model allows the authors  to iden-  analysis  in  developing  and  transition  Research Group - is part of a larger ef-
tify different notions of contagion, espe-  economies. Recanatini, Wallsten, and Xu  fort  in the  group  to develop consistent
cially the distinction between "monsoonal  take stock of some recent  Bank surveys  cross-country firm level surveys. Copies  of
effects," "spillovers," and  'switchers  be-  and discuss how to improve their results.  the  paper  are  available  free  from  the
tween equilibria."  Lessons on data issues and hypothesis  World  Bank, 1818  H Street NW,  Washing-
They discuss both domestic and inter-  testing:  ton, DC 20433. Please contact Paulina
national policy  options.  * Use panel data, if possible.  Sintim-Aboagye, room  MC3-422, tele-
Domestic policies, they say, should be  * Have enough information about pro-  phone  202-473-7644, fax 202-522-1155,
aimed at  reducing financial  fragility - ductivity  to estimate a production  function.  email  address  psintimaboagye
that is, reducing unnecessary short-term  * Avoid  the paradigm of 'list the sever-  @worldbank.org. Policy Research Work-
debt commitments. With explicit commit-  ity of the obstacle/problem on a scale of 1  ing Papers are also posted on the Web at
ments,  the  maturity  of external  debts  to 5.Instead,  askfordataonspecificdi-  www.worldbank.org/research/
should be lengthened. With implicit com-  mensions of the problem that  will shed  workingpapers. The authors may be con-
mitments, such as private liability guar-  light on alternative hypotheses and policy  tacted  at  frecanatini@worldbank.org,
antees, they emphasize limiting or elimi-  recommendations.  wallsten@leland.stanford.edu,  or  lxul
nating  such  guarantees,  to improve an  * Pick particular  disaggregated indus-  @worldbank.org.  (44 pages)
economy's international liquidity and re-  tries and sample those industries in each
duce its exposure to contagion.  survey.
Internationally, they stress the need for  * Identify  the  most  important  policy  2308.  How  Small  Should  an
improving  financial  standards,  which  interventions ofinterest and consider how  Economy's  Fiscal  Deficit  Be?:
makes it easier to assess when a country  you  will  empirically  identify  specific  A Monetary  Programming
is subject to different kinds of contagion.  changes by picking instruments useful for  Approach
The effectiveness of international  rescue  doing so.
packages depends on the kind ofcontagion  Lessons on questionnaire design:  Paul Beckerman
to which a country is exposed.  * Incorporate only one idea or dimen-  (March  2000)
Implications:  The international commu-  sion in each question. Do not ask, in one
nity should help those countries that  are  question, about the "quality, integrity, and  A spreadsheetplanning  model to help de-
already helping themselves.  efficiency"  of services, for example.  termine the government deficit consistent
This paper-a  productofthe  Financial  * Consider the costs and benefits of nu-  with a specified vector  of country macro-
Sector Strategy  and  Policy Group - is  meric  scales  compared  with  adjectival  economic objectives.4  Policy Research Working Paper Series
Beckerman describes a spreadsheet plan-  development are an indirect but effective  202-522-3518,  email  address  kkhine
ning model to help determine the govern-  way to raiseprivate saving rates  - which  @worldbank.org. Policy Research Work-
ment  deficit  consistent  with  a  policy-  rise with the level and growth rate of real  ing Papers are also posted on the Web at
maker's "vector" of principal  macroeco-  per capita income.  w ww  w o r l d b a n k. o r gl r e s e a r c h/
nomic  objectives  (including  real  GDP  workingpapers. The authors may be con-
growth, inflation, exchange rate, and in-  Loayza, Schmidt-Hebbel, and Serven in-  tacted  at  nloayza@worldbank.org  or
ternational  reserve accumulation).  The  vestigate the policy  and nonpolicy  factors  lserven@worldbank.org. (32 pages)
model focuses on the monetary accounts,  behind  saving disparities,  using a large
applying  balance-of-payments forecasts  panel data set and an encompassing ap-
formulated  separately but based on the  proach including several relevant  deter-  2310.  How  Politics  and  Institutions
same macroeconomic  objectives.  minants  of private  saving. They extend  Affect  Pension  Reform  in Three
The model is a  consistency exercise,  the literature  in several dimensions by:  Postcommunist  Countries
intended as part of a broader consistency  * Using the largest data set on aggre-
exercise for a given macroeconomy.  It of-  gate saving assembled to date.  Mitchell  A.  Orenstein
fers one more perspective on the question  * Using panel  instrumental  variable  (March  2000)
of how large a government deficit should  techniques to correct for endogeneity and
be - a  perspective that  can be used in  heterogeneity.  During reform's three  phases - commit-
conjunction with others.  * Performing  robustness  checks  on  ment-building,  coalition-building,  and
For  each  forecast  period, the  model  changes in estimation  procedures, data  implementation  - there  are  tradeoffs
determines  consistent  period-end  and  samples, and model specification.  among inclusiveness (ofprocess), radical-
period-average stocks for the economy's  Their main empirical findings:  ism (of  reform), and participation in, and
outstanding  central  bank  assets  and  *  Private saving rates  show consider-  compliance with, the new system. Includ-
liabilities and government obligations. It  able inertia (are highly serially correlated  ing more, and more various, veto  andpro-
applies  forecasting  assumptions  about  even after controlling for other relevant  posal actors early in the deliberative  pro-
interest  rates  to forecast central  bank  factors).  cess  may increase buy-in and compliance
profit-and-loss  flows,  and takes account of  * Private  saving rates  rise  with  the  when pension reform is implemented, but
these in determining the  overall flow of  level and growth rate  of real per capita  at the expense  offaster andgreater change.
resources that  would be available to fi-  income. So  policies  that spur development
nance the government deficit.  are an indirect but effective way to raise  Orenstein examines the political and in-
An annex describes a (purely illustra-  private saving rates.  stitutional processes that produced  funda-
tive) simulation carried out during 1999  *  Predictions of the life-cycle hypoth-  mental pension reform in three post-com-
for Ecuador.  esis  are  supported  in  that  dependency  munist countries: Hungary, Kazakhstan,
This paper - a product of the Poverty  ratios generally have a negative effect on  and Poland. He tests various hypotheses
Reduction  and  Economic Management  private saving rates.  about the relationship between delibera-
Sector Unit, Latin America and the Car-  *  The precautionary motive for saving  tive  process and  outcomes through  de-
ibbean Region - is part of a larger effort  is supported by the finding that inflation  tailed case studies of pension reform.
in the region to strengthen  the tools for  - conventionally taken  as  a  summary  The outcomes of reform were similar:
macroeconomic  policy  analysis and plan-  measure  of macroeconomic volatility - each country implemented a mandatory
ning in the region's economies. Copies of  has a positive impact on private saving,  funded pension system as part of reform,
the  paper  are  available  free from  the  holding other facts constant.  but  the  extent  and  configuration  of
World  Bank, 1818  H Street NW,  Washing-  *  Fiscal policy  is a moderately effective  changes differed greatly.
ton,  DC 20433.  Please  contact  Hazel  tool for raising national saving.  Countries  with more "veto actors" -
Vargas, room 18-138,  telephone 202-473-  *  The direct effects of financial liberal-  social and institutional  actors with an ef-
8546, fax  202-522-2119, email  address  ization are largely detrimental to private  fective veto over reform  - engaged in less
hvargas@worldbank.org.  Policy  Research  saving rates. Greater availability ofcredit  radical  reform, as theory predicted. Po-
Working Papers  are  also posted on the  reduces the private saving rate; financial  land and Hungary generated less radica.
Web  at  www.worldbank.org/research/  depth and higher real interest rates do  not  change than  Kazakhstan, partly because
workingpapers. The author may be con-  increase saving.  they have more representative  politica.
tacted at pbeckerman@worldbank.org.  (34  This paper  - a product of Macroeco-  systems, to which more associations, in-
pages)  nomics and  Growth,  Development Re-  terest groups, and "proposal actors" have
search Group - is part of a larger effort  access. Proposal actors shape the refornm
in the group to understand  the determi-  agenda and influence the positions of key
2309. What  Drives  Private  Saving  nants  of saving in developing countries.  veto actors. Pension reform takes longei
around  the  World?  The study was funded by the Bank's Re-  in countries with more veto and proposa.
search Support Budget underthe research  actors,  such  as  Poland  and  Hungary
Norman  Loayza,  Klaus Schmidt-Hebbel,  project "Saving in the World: Puzzles and  Legacies  of policy,  the development of  civi
and Luis Serven  Policies"  (RPO 681-36).  Copies of this pa-  society, and international  organizationt
(March  2000)  per  are  available  free  from the  World  also  profoundly  affect  the  shape  ant
Bank, 1818  H StreetNW, Washington, DC  progress of reform.
Saving  rates  vary considerably  across  20433.  Please contact Emily Khine, room  Orenstein sees pension reform as hap
countries and over  time. Policies that spur  MC3-341, telephone  202-473-7471, fax  pening  in  three  phases:  commitmentPolicy  Research Working Paper Series  5
building, coalition-building, and  imple-  attention and caused considerable contro-  2312. Measuring Governance,
mentation.  He  presents  hypotheses  about  versy in Argentina.  Corruption,  and  State  Capture:
tradeoffs  among inclusiveness (ofprocess),  It was one of the world's largest conces-  How Firms and Bureaucrats
radicalism (of reform), and participation  sions, but the case was also interesting for  Shape the Business  Environment
in, and compliance with, the new system.  other reasons. The concession  was imple-  in Transition Economies
One hypothesis: Including more, and  mented  rapidly,  in  contrast  with  slow
more various, veto and  proposal  actors  implementation  of  privatization  in  Joel  S. Hellman,  Geraint  Jones,
early in the deliberative process increases  Santiago, for example. And reform gener-  Daniel  Kaufmann,  and Mark  Schankerman
buy-in and  compliance when reform is  ated major improvements in the sector,  (April  2000)
implemented, but at the expense of faster  including wider coverage,  better service,
and greater change.  more efficient company operations,  and  In a new approach to measuring.typically
Early challenges in implementation in  reduced waste. Moreover,  the winning bid  "subjective"  variables,  BEEPS -the  1999
all  three  countries,  but  especially  in  brought an immediate 26.9  percent reduc-  Business  Environment  and  Enterprise
Kazakhstan,  suggest  the importance  of  tion in water system tariffs.  Performance  Survey, the transition econo-
improving buy-in through inclusive delib-  Consumers benefited from the system's  mies component of the  World Business
erative processes, where possible.  expansion and from the immediate drop  Environment  Survey  - quantitatively
This paper - a product of Poverty and  in real prices, which was only partly re-  assesses governance from the perspective
Human  Resources,  Development  Re-  versed by subsequent  changes in tariffs  of about 3,000 firms in 20 countries. Un-
search Group - is part of a larger effort  and  access charges. And these improve-  bundling the measurement of governance
in the group to study the political  economy  ments would probably not have occurred  and corruption empirically suggests the
of pension reform. This study was funded  under public administration ofthe system.  importance of grand corruption in some
by the Bank's Research Support Budget  Still, as Alcazar, Abdala, and  Shirley  countries, manifested in state capture by
under the research project "The Political  show, information asymmetries, perverse  the corporate sector - through the "pur-
Economy  of Pension Reform"  (RPO 682-  incentives, and weak regulatory institu-  chase"ofdecrees and legislation  - and by
17).  Copies of the paper are available free  tions  could  threaten  the  concession's  graft in procurement.
from the World Bank, 1818 H Street NW,  sustainability. Opportunities for the com-
Washington,  DC 20433. Please  contact  pany to act opportunistically - and the  As a  symptom of fundamental  institu-
Marianne  Leenaerts,  room J2-002, tele-  regulator, arbitrarily  - exist because of  tional weaknesses, corruption needs to be
phone  202-458-4264, fax 202-676-0961,  politicized regulation, a poor information  viewed  within  a  broader  governance
email  address  mleenaerts@worldbank.  base, serious flaws in the concession  con-  framework. It thrives where  the state  is
org. Policy Research Working Papers are  tract,  a lumpy and ad hoc tariff system,  unable to reign over its  bureaucracy, to
also  posted  on  the  Web  at  www.  and a general lack of transparency  in the  protect property and contractual rights, or
worldbank.org/research/workingpapers.  regulatory process.  to provide institutions  that  support the
The author may be contacted at maorenst  Because of these circumstances, public  rule of law. Furthermore, governance fail-
@syr.edu.  (75 pages)  confidence  in the process has eroded. The  ures at the  national level cannot be iso-
Buenos Aires concession shows how im-  lated from the interface between the cor-
portant  transparent,  rule-based  porate  and  state  sectors,  in particular
2311.  The Buenos Aires Water  decisionmaking is to maintaining  public  from the heretofore underemphasized in-
Concession  trust in regulated infrastructure.  fluence that firms may exert on the state.
This paper - a product of Regulation  Under certain conditions, corporate strat-
Lorena  Alcazar,  Manuel  A.  Abdala,  and  Competition  Policy,  Development  egies may exacerbate misgovernance at
and Mary  M.  Shirley  Research Group - is part of a larger ef-  the national level.
(April  2000)  fort in the group to analyze institutional  An in-depth empirical assessment ofthe
issues  in regulated  infrastructure.  The  links  between  corporate  behavior  and
Transparent, rule-based decisionmaking  study was funded by the Bank's Research  national  governance  can  thus  provide
is important to maintaining  public trust  Support  Budget  under  the  research  particular  insights.  The 1999 Business
in regulated infrastructure. The Buenos  project "Institutions,  Politics, and  Con-  Environment  and  Enterprise  Perfor-
Aires water and sanitation concession  led  tracts:  Private  Sector  Participation  in  mance Survey (BEEPS) - the transition
to remarkable improvements in delivery  Urban Water Supply"(RPO 681-87).  Cop-  economies  component  of  the  ongoing
and coverage  ofservices  and to lowerprices  ies ofthis paper are available free from  the  World Business Environment Survey -
for consumers. But  a poor information  World  Bank, 1818  H Street NW, Washing-  assesses in detail the various dimensions
base, lack of transparency in regulatory  ton,  DC 20433. Please contact  Paulina  of governance  from  the  perspective  of
decisions, and the ad hoc nature of execu-  Sintim-Aboagye, room  MC3-422, tele-  about 3,000 firms in 20 countries. After
tive branch interventions make it difficult  phone 202-473-8526, fax 202-522-1155,  introducing  the  survey framework and
to reassure consumers that their welfare  email  address  psintimaboagye  measurement  approach, Hellman, Jones,
is being  protected and that the concession  @worldbank.org. Policy Research Work-  Kaufinann, and Schankermanpresentthe
is sustainable.  ing Papers are also posted on the Web at  survey results,  focusing on governance,
www.worldbank.org/research/  corruption, andstatecapture.
The  signing ofa concession  contract for  the  workingpapers. Mary Shirley may be con-  By  unbundling  governance  into  its
Buenos  Aires  water and sanitation system  tacted  at  mshirley@worldbank.org. (62  many dimensions, BEEPS permits an in-
in December 1992 attracted  worldwide  pages)  depth empirical assessment. The authors6  Policy Research Working Paper Series
pay special attention  to certain forms of  Financial liberalization  was expected to  local participation  facilitates  the transfer
grand corruption, notably state capture by  make interest rates and asset prices more  of technology  and  marketing  skills.  How-
parts of  the corporate sector - that is, the  volatile,  with distributional consequences  ever, foreign  investors  who are technologi-
propensity of firms to shape the underly-  such  as reduced or relocated rents  and  cal or marketing  leaders in their industries
ing rules of the game by 'purchasing"  de-  increased  competition  in financial  ser-  are more  likely  to invest  in wholly owned
crees, legislation,  and  influence  at  the  vices. Honohan examines available data  projects  than  to share ownership.  Thus  in
central bank, which is found to be preva-  on money market and bank interest rates  R&D-intensive  sectors joint  ventures may
lent in a number of transition economies.  for  evidence  of  whether  these  things  offer lesspotentialfor  transferring  technol-
The survey also measures other dimen-  happened.  ogy and marketing  techniques than  wholly
sions of grand corruption, including those  He shows that as more and more coun-  owned  subsidiaries.
associated with public procurement, and  tries  liberalized, the level and  dynamic
quantifies the more traditional (pettier")  behavior of developing-country interest  Developing  country governments tend to
forms of corruption.  rates  converged  to  industrial-country  favor joint ventures  over other forms of
Cross-country  surveys may suffer from  norms. In  the short  term,  volatility in-  foreign direct investment, believing that
bias if firms tend to systematically over-  creased in both real and nominal money  local participation facilitates the transfer
or underestimate  the extent of problems  market interest rates. Treasury bill rates  of  technology  and  marketing  skills.
within their country. The authors provide  and bank spreads, evidently the most re-  Smarzynska  assesses joint ventures'  po-
a new test for this potential bias, finding  pressed, showed the greatest  increase as  tential for  such transfersby comparingthe
little evidence of country perception bias  liberalization progressed - shifting sub-  characteristics  of foreign  investors  en-
in BEEPS.  stantial rents  from the public sector and  gaged in joint ventures with those of for-
This paper - a joint product of Gover-  from favored borrowers.  eign investors engaged in wholly owned
nance, Regulation,  and  Finance, World  Whereas quoted bank spreads in indus-  projects in  transition  economies in the
Bank Institute, and the Chief Economist's  trial countries contracted  somewhat in the  early 1990s.
Office,  European Bank for  Reconstruction  late 1990s,  spreads in developing  countries  Unlike  the  existing  literature,
and Development - is part of a larger  remained much  higher, presumably  reflect-  Smarzynska  focuses on  intra-industry
program to measure governance and cor-  ingbothmarketpowerandthehigherrisks  differences  rather  than  interindustry
ruption worldwide.  A companion working  of lending in the developing  world.  differences  in  R&D  and  advertising
paper that econometrically analyzes the  There was no clear-cut change iL. mean  intensity.
effects  of  state capture is forthcoming. For  rates of  inflation, monetary depth, or GDP  Empirical analysis shows that foreign
further details, visit www.worldbank.org/  growth. If anything, there  was a small  investors who are technological  or market-
wbi/governance. Copies of this paper are  average improvement in inflation, but a  ing leaders in their  industries  are more
available free from the World Bank, 1818  decline in monetary depth and economic  likely to invest in wholly owned projects
H Street  NW, Washington,  DC 20433.  growth, relative  to trends  in industrial  than  to share  ownership.  This is  true
Please contact Diane Bouvet, room J3-  countries.  in high- and  medium-technology sectors
273,  telephone 202-473-5818,  fax 202-334-  This  paper  - a  product  of Finance,  but  not  in  industries  with  low  R&D
8350,  email address dbouvet@worldbank.  Development Research Group - is part  spending.
org. Policy Research Working Papers are  of a larger  effort in the group to explore  Smarzynska  concludes that  it is inap-
also  posted  on  the  Web  at  www.  optimal policy  under financial liberaliza-  propriate to treat  industries  as homoge-
worldbank.org/research/workingpapers.  tion. Copies  ofthe paper are available free  neous in investigating  modes of invest-
The  authors  may  be  contacted  at  from the World Bank, 1818  H Street NW,  ment. She also suggests  that  in sectors
dkaufmann@worldbank.org or hellmanj  Washington,  DC 20433. Please contact  with high R&D spending joint ventures
@ebrd.com.  (44 pages)  Agnes Yaptenco, room  MC3-446, tele-  may present less potential for transfer of
phone  202-473-1823, fax 202-522-1155,  technology  and  marketing  techniques
email address ayaptenco@worldbank.org.  than wholly owned subsidiaries.
2313. How Interest Rates Changed  Policy  Research Working Papers are also  This paper - a product of Trade, De-
under Financial Liberalization:  posted  on the Web  at www.worldbank.orgl  velopment Research Group - is part of a
A Cross-Country Review  research/workingpapers. The author may  larger effort in the group to study the con-
be  contacted  at  phonohan@worldbank.  tribution  of trade  and  foreign direct in-
Patrick Honohan  org. (48 pages)  vestment to technology transfer. Copies  of
(April  2000)  the  paper  are  available  free from  the
World  Bank, 1818 H Street NW, Washing-
As financial  liberalizationprogressed,  the  2314.Technological  Leadership  ton, DC  20433.  Please contact Lil Tabada,
general level of real interest rates increased  and  Foreign  Investors'  Choice  room MC3-333,  telephone  202-473-6896,
more  in developing  countries  than  it did  of Entry  Mode  fax 202-522-1159,  email address Itabade
in industrial  countries.  Volatility  in whole-  @worldbank.org.  Policy  Research  Work-
sale interest rates also  jumped,  often mark-  Beata K. Smarzynska  ing Papers  are also posted on the Web at
edly,  in most liberalizing  countries.  Trea-  (April 2000)  w w w. w o r I d b a n k. o r gl r e s e a r c h,
sury  bill rates and  bank  spreads  showed  workingpapers. The author may be con-
the greatest  increase  in developing  coun-  Developing  country  governments  tend  to  tacted  at  bsmarzynska@worldbank.org
tries, shifting  substantial  rents  from  the  favor joint  ventures  over other  forms  of  (31 pages)
publicsectorandfromfavored  borrowers.  foreign  direct  investment,  believing  thatPolicy  Research  Working  Paper  Series  7
2315.  Investment  in Natural  Gas  522-2029,  email  address  msalehi  being decentralized. When public spend-
Pipelines  in the Southern  Cone  @worldbank.org. Policy Research Work-  ing is on a private (excludable) good,  and
of Latin  America  ing Papers are also posted on the Web at  there  is no self-targeting mechanism to
www.worldbank.org/research/  ensure  that  only the  poor  participate,
Alejandro  Jadresic  workingpapers. The author may be con-  there is ample scope  for  local mistargeting.
(April  2000)  tacted atjadresic@creuna.cl. (29 pages)  This paper - a product of Poverty and
Human  Resources,  Development  Re-
The natural gas pipelines between  Argen-  search Group - is part of a larger effort
tina and Chile  are large-scale  investments  2316. Distributional  Outcomes  in the group to assess the performance of
in competitive environments. Jadresic, a  of a Decentralized  Welfare  alternative  means of reaching  the  poor
former minister of energy in Chile, argues  Program  through public programs. The study was
that a competitive energy sector and free  funded by the  Bank's Research Support
entry were important policy initiatives to  Emanuela  Galasso  and Martin  Ravallion  Budget under the research  project "Poli-
spur  the  cross-border investments  that  (April  2000)  cies  for Poor Areas" (RPO 681-39).  Copies
have benefited Chile's energy sector and  of this paper  are available free from the
environment.  Community-level targeting of antipoverty  World  Bank, 1818 H Street NW,  Washing-
programs is now  common.  Do local  commu-  ton,  DC 20433. Please contact  Patricia
Increasing  demand  for  clean  energy  nity organizations target the poor better  Sader, room MC4-773,  telephone 202-473-
sources is expanding investment in natu-  than the central government? In one pro-  3902, fax 202-522-1153, email  address
ral gas infrastructure  around the world.  gram in Bangladesh, the answer tends to  psaderaworldbank.org.  Policy Research
Many international projects involve  pipe-  be yes, butperformance varies from village  Working Papers  are  also posted on the
lines connecting energy markets in two or  to village.  The authors try to explain why.  Web  at  www.worldbank.org/researchl
more countries.  workingpapers. The authors may be con-
A key feature ofinvestment taking place  It is common for central governments to  tacted  at  egalasso@worldbank.org or
in Latin America is the convergence  of  gas  delegate authority  over the targeting  of  mravallion@worldbank.org.  (37 pages)
and electricity markets. Many projects are  welfare programs to local community or-
being  developed to  supply  gas  to new  ganizations  - which may be better  in-
power generation plants  needed to meet  formed about who is poor, though possi-  2317.  Trade Negotiations  in the
electricity demand.  bly less accountable for getting the money  Presence  of Network  Externalities
Construction  of  a  pipeline  over  the  to the local poor-  while the center retains
Andes mountains to supply gas from Ar-  control over how much goes to each local  Keiko  Kubota
gentina to energy markets in central Chile  region.  (April  2000)
was an idea long unfulfilled for political,  Galasso and Ravallion outline a theo-
economic, and  technical reasons.  Great  retical model  ofthe interconnected behav-  With technology-related goods and  ser-
changes have now taken place in a very  ior of the various actors in such a setting.  vices, thepresence of network externalities
short time.  The model's information  structure  pro-  affects a country's willingness to trade. To
Jadresic  discusses  both  the  achieve-  vides scope  for econometric  identification.  achieve efficiency gains  through world-
ments and the challenges to be faced by  Applying data for a specific program in  wide standardization and mutually  ben-
pipeline developers and Chile's energy sec-  Bangladesh, they find that overall target-  eficial trade arrangements, it is important
tor. He details the benefits of the coopera-  ing was mildly pro-poor, mostly because  to arrive at multilateral trade agreements
tive effort to consumers in terms of lower  of successful  targeting within villages.  But  before  regional blocs  form.
energy prices, higher environmental stan-  this varied across villages. Although  some
dards, and a more reliable energy system.  village  characteristics  promoted  better  Network externalities exist when the ben-
The  experience  in  Latin  America's  targeting,  these were  generally not the  efit  a consumer derives from a  good or
Southern  Cone shows how technological  same characteristics  that  attracted  re-  service depends on the  number of other
innovation,  economic deregulation,  and  sources from the center.  consumers using the same good  or service
regional integration  make it possible to  Galasso and Ravallion observe  that the  (as happens, for example, with telecom-
build  major  international  gas  pipeline  center's desire for broad geographic cov-  munications,  television  broadcasting
projects within a competitive framework  erage  appears  to  have  severely  con-  standards,  and  many other technology-
and without direct state involvement.  strained the scope  for  pro-poor  village tar-  related goods and services).
This paper - a product of Private Par-  geting. However,  poor villages tended not  National  monopolies,  regulated  and
ticipation in Infrastructure,  Private  Sec-  to be better at reaching their  poor.  endorsed  by  sovereign  governments,
tor Advisory Services Department  - is  They find some evidence that local in-  tended to produce network externalities
part of a larger effort in the department  stitutions  matter.  The presence of coop-  in the past: most countries had telephone
to analyze and disseminate the principles  eratives for farmers and the landless ap-  monopolies,  often state-owned, before de-
of, and good  practice for, promoting com-  pears to be associated with more pro-poor  regulation. Whether to allow foreign  com-
petition in infrastructure.  Copies of the  program targeting. The presence ofrecre-  petition  in  such  industries  becomes a
paper  are available free from the World  ational clubs has the opposite effect.  pressing issue when national boundaries
Bank, 1818  H Street NW,  Washington, DC  Sometimes the benefits of  decentralized  begin to blur as technology advances and
20433. Please contact Mina Salehi, room  social programs  are  captured  by  local  as previously untraded goods  and services
110-118,  telephone 202-473-7157,  fax 202-  elites, depending on the type of spending  become tradable.8  Policy Research Working Paper Series
Despite obvious gains  from  trade  in  downstream activities and magnifying the  This paper  is a product of Public Eco-
such newly tradable sectors, governments  economvwide benefits of reform. The na-  nomics,  Development Research  Group.
often  keep trade-prohibiting  measures.  tional competition agency  can help  greatly  The study was funded by the Bank's Re-
With  analog high  definition television  in laying  the groundwork for reform by  searchSupportBudgetundertheresearch
(HDTV) transmission standards,  for ex-  making a compelling case  for the reform's  project "Competition and Barriers to En-
ample, regulations  and politics kept Eu-  expected benefits.  trepreneurship"  (RPO 682-57). Copies of
rope and Japan from cooperating, so each  this  paper  are  available  free from  the
invested heavily to develop its system in  Discussions  of competition  and regulatory  World  Bank, 1818  H Street NW,  Washing-
an  attempt  to  have  its  own  standard  reform typically focus  on price and quan-  ton,  DC  20433.  Please  contact  Hedy
adopted by the rest  of the world.  tity effects. But improving certain infra-  Sladovich,  room MC2-609,  telephone 202-
Kubota analyzes  how the  presence of  structure  services can also stimulate  en-  473-7698, fax  202-522-1154, email  ad-
network externalities affects a country's  try  and  competition in user  industries  dress hsladovich@)worldbank.org.  Policy
willingness to trade. In her model,  govern-  downstream, allowing new  firms to enter,  Research Working Papers are also posted
ments decide whether or not to allow in-  incumbent  users to offer new products,  on the  Web at  www.worldbank.org/re-
ternational trade. When  trading is permit-  and rivalry to intensify.  search/workingpapers. The authors may
ted, the superior standard  drives out all  Dutz, Hayri, and Ibarra present a case  be  contacted  at  mdutz@worldbank.org,
others in the trading  area.  study of how innovations in road freight  ahayri@dttus.com,  or  ibarrarodriguez_
She shows that  even when there  are  services affect selected downstream users  pablo@jpmorgan.com.  (48 pages)
efficiency  gains from worldwide  standard-  of those services after regulatory reform.
ization, global free trade may not prevail.  After a  period of rigid  regulation  and
The technology leader is generally eager  heavy government interference, Mexico  in  2319. Externalities and Production
to trade, but countries with less advanced  1989 developed a new policy framework  Efficiency
technology  often choose  to form inefficient  for road transport,  with  free entry and
regional blocs or not to trade at all. Once  market-based  price setting.  The result:  Gunnar S. Eskeland
such regional networks are established,  faster, more reliable trucking has allowed  (April 2000)
global efficiency-enhancing free trade be-  user companies to offer new, previously
comes even harder  to  achieve than  it  unavailable  products  and  to reach new  Environmental  improvements should be
would have been in their  absence.  areas  with  existing products.  Cheaper,  sought from different polluters (public or
Transfer payments between countries  more customer-responsive trucking  ser-  private, producer or consumer,  rich  or
reduce or eliminate such inefficiency  and  vices have allowed logistical innovations  poor) at the same cost, regardless of the
facilitate  the  acbieve:-lent of  efficient  in user firms, and some user firms have  nature of the polluting  activity  Under a
trade in products.  decided not to keep their  own fleets of  plausible  structure of monitoring costs,
To achieve mutually  beneficial  trade  trucks but to outsource trucking services  emissions standards play a central role.
arrangements,  it is important to arrive at  on the open market,  thereby  converting
multilateral  agreements  before regional  fixed costs to variable costs. For one fer-  Eskeland brings together two of govern-
blocs form.  tilizer  company, the  benefits  of reform  ment's primary challenges:  environmental
This paper is a product of  Trade, Devel-  included  a  10 percent  improvement  in  protectionandtaxationtogeneraterevenues.
opment Research Group. Copies  of the pa-  operating margin.  If negative externalities can be reduced
per are available free  from the World  Bank,  Successful  reform requires careful  plan-  not only by changes in consumption pat-
1818  H Street NW,  Washington,  DC 20433.  ning and execution and political support  terns  but  also by making each  activity
Please contact  Lili Tabada, room  MC3-333,  at high levels.  Regulatory reform also pro-  cleaner  (abatement  efforts),  how  shall
telephone  202-473-6896,  fax 202-522-1159,  foundly changes the sectoral institution  inducements  to various  approaches  be
email  address  ltabada@worldbank.org.  formerly responsible for the  regulation.  combined? If negative externalities  are
Policy  Research Working Papers are also  Enough resources should be provided to  caused by agents as different as consum-
posted on the Web  at www.worldbank.org/  help organizations in the reformed indus-  ers, producers, and government, how does
researchl/workingpapers.  The author may  try make the transition to the post-reform  optimal policy combine inducements  to
be contacted at  kkubota@worldbank.org.  environment  - helping with such tasks  reduce pollution?
(27 pages)  as defining  the organization's new role  and  Intuitively  it seems right  to tax emis-
facilitating the redeployment of staff.  sions neutrally,  based on marginal dam-
The national  competition agency can  ages - no matter which activity pollutes
2318. Regulatory  Reform,  help greatly in laying the groundwork for  or whether  the polluter  is rich or poor,
Competition, and Innovation:  reform by making a compelling case for  consumer or producer, private or public.
A Case Study of the Mexican  the reform's expected benefits. After re-  Eskeland provides a theoretical basis for
Road Freight Industry  form, the competition agency should also  such simplicity.
help with enforcement, to ensure that the  Three  assumptions  are  critical to his
Mark  A. Dotz,  Aydin  Hauri,  cozy, cartel-like behavior stimulated  by  analysis:
and Pablo  Ibarra  tight entry restrictions  does not persist.  * Returns to scale do not influence the
(April  2000)  In Mexico,  three strong interventions were  traditional problem of  revenue generation.
required  to  discipline  attempted  anti-  *  Consumers have equal access  to pol-
Regulatory reform can spur innovations in  competitive practices in the trucking in-  lution abatement  opportunities  (but  he
infrastructure  services, generating  new  dustry in the years following  reform.  also relaxes this  assumption).Policy  Research  Working  Paper  Series  9
- Planners can differentiate policy in-  The relationship between the intensity of  tions of the number of courses of vaccine
struments (emission taxes or abatement  competition in an economy  and its long-  that will be needed.
standards)  by polluting  good, and  by  run growth is an open question in econom-  They consider a hypothetical  vaccine
whether the polluter is a consumer, pro-  ics. Thcoretically, there  is no clear-cut  costing$10toproduce,andoffering60per-
dacer, or  government, but  they  cannot  answer.  cent, 75 percent, and 90 percent reduc-
differentiate such instruments  (or com-  Empirical  evidence exists,  however,  tions in the risk of HIV for 10 years. For
modity taxes) by personal characteristics  that  in some sectors more competition  each of the world's 10 major geographic
or  make them  nonlinear  in  individual  leads to more innovation and accelerates  divisions,  they use published estimates of
emissions.  productivity growth.  the risk of AIDS,  the value of  medical  costs
Among  Eskeland's findings and conclu-  To complement  those findings and cap-  averted, and the value of potential produc-
sions: Abatement efforts  and consumption  ture economywide  effects,  Dutz and Hayri  tivity losses.
adjustments  at  all stages  are optimally  conduct  across-country  study. They  exam-  Under the "health sector" algorithm -
stimulated by a uniform emission tax lev-  ine the impact on growth of various mea-  in which purchases are made to minimize
led simply where emissions occur.  sures having to  dowith intensity of  domes-  the impact of AIDS/HIV  on government
It simplifies things that optimal abate-  tic competition - beyond the  effects of  health spending - 766 million courses of
ment is independent of whether the car is  trade liberalization.  vaccine would be purchased. Under the
used by government, firms, or households  Their results indicate a strong correla-  "societal"  algorithm -in  which  purchases
- for weddings or for work.  tion between long-run growth and effec-  are made to minimize  the impact of AIDS/
It also simplifies implenmentation  that  tive enforcement of antitrust  and compe-  HIV  on health spending and GDP  -- more
the stimulus to abatement  at one stage  tition policy,  than  3.7 billion courses of vaccine would
(say,  the  factory)  is  independent  of  An earlier version of this  paper - a  be purchased.
whether it yields emission  reductions  from  product of Public Economics, Develop-  Under an "equity" model - allocating
the factory or from others (say, from car  ment Research  Group  -was  presented at  vaccines to everyone in the world at high
owners who buy the factory's products).  a conference, Industrial  Reorganization  risk as if they had the financial resources
Finally, ministers of finance and of the  and  Development, in Toulouse, France  ofWestern Europeans-vaccine  would  be
environment should coordinate efforts,  (November 19989.  The study was funded  offered to 4.7 billion people. For a West-
but they need not engage in each other's  by the Bank's Research Support Budget  erm  European man, reducing the risk of
business.  The minister  of environment  under  the  research  project "Does More  HIV/AIDS  would be a  $789 concern; in
need not know which commodities are  Intense  Competition  Lead  to  Higher  Africa, the comparable risk  would be a
elastic in demand and thus would bear a  Growth?" (RPO 682-47). Copies of this  $48,577  crisis.
low commodity  tax. The finance minister  paper are available free from the World  The authors  conclude that  financing
need  not  know which  commodities or  Bank, 1818  H Street NW,  Washington,  DC  AIDS vaccines solely on the fixed budget
agents pollute  or who  pays emission  taxes.  20433. Please  contact Hedy Sladovich,  of a ministry of health  means large vul-
Tlhis  paper - a product of Public Eco-  room MC2-609,  telephone 202-473-7698,  nerable populations wouldn't receive the
nomics, Development  Research Group  - fax  202-522-1154,  email  address  vaccine. Allocating the vaccine based on
is part of a larger  effort in the  group to  hsladovich@worldbank.org. Policy  Re-  society's ability to pay would still exclude
establish  principles for public interven-  search Working  Papers are also posted on  many poor  infants who would probably  be
tion. Copies of  the paper are available free  the Web  at www.worldbank.org/research/  iimmunized  if they were born in more de-
from the World  Bank, 1818  H Street NW,  workingpapers. The authors may be con-  veloped regions.
Washinigton, DC 20433. Please contact  tacted at mdutz@worldbank.org  or ahayri  Policymakers concerned  about equity in
Hedy  Sladovich, room MC2-609, tele-  @dttus.com.  (25 pages)  health care must redouble efforts to mak-
phone  202-473-7698, fax 202-522-1154,  ing the financing of development and dis-
email addresshsladovich@worldbank.org.  tribution of AIDS vaccines a global,  not a
Policy  Research Working  Papers are also  2321. Algorithms  for Purchasing  regional, concern.
posted on the Web at  www.worldbank.  AIDS Vaccines  This paper  was commissioned by the
org/research/workingpapers. The author  World Bank AIDS Vaccine Task  Force,
may  be  contacted  at  geskeland  David  Bishai.  Maria  K.  Lin,  cochaired by  Poverty  and  Human  Re-
@worldbank.org.  (43 pages)  and C.  W.  B. Kiyonga  sources,  Development Research Group
(April  2000)  and the Health, Nutrition, and Population
Team,  Human  Development Network.
2320. Does More Intense  "Demand' for AIDS vaccines varies by  Copies  ofthis paper are available freefrom
Competition  Lead  to Higher  level  of riskand by  national wealth.  At-risk  the  World Bank,  1818 H  Street  NW,
Growth?  individualsinpoorcountriessufferonboth  Washington, DC 20433. Please contact
counts. Providing funds  to develop and  Patricia Sader, room MC3-556,  telephone
Mark  A.  Dutz  and Aydin Hayri  distribute AIDS vaccines should be a glo-  202-473-3902, fax  202-522-1153, email
(April  2000)  bal concern.  address  psader@worldbank.org. Policy
Research  Working Papers are also posted
Empirical evidence  indicates a strong cor-  Bishai, Lin, and Kiyonga delineate two  on the  Web at  www.worldbank.org/re-
relation between  long-run growth and ef-  different algorithms for the  purchase of  search/workingpapers. David Bishai may
fective enforcement of antitrust and com-  AIDS  vaccines, to  show how differences  in  be contacted  at dbishai@jhsph.edu. (32
petition policy,  policy  objectives  can greatly affect projec-  pages)10  Policy Research Working Paper Series
2322. Self-Targeted  Subsidies:  eliminating  current  subsidies  on sugar  or  affected  less by financial  liberalization.
The  Distributional  Impact of the  edible oil. Neither  of these  foods is an 'in-  Finally,  they  show that  leverage  ratios
Egyptian  Food Subsidy  System  ferior" good, so eliminating  these subsidies  increase  during  times  of crisis.
will have  only  a minimal  impact  on the  In an appendix,  they analyze  the previ-
Richard H. Adams,  Jr.  welfare  status  of the poor.  ously unstudied  case of Argentina,  which
(April 2000)  This paper  - a product  of the Poverty  experienced  sharp  financial  liberalization
Division, Poverty Reduction and Economic  and was hit hard by all recent global crises.
By gradually  reducing the number of sub-  Management  Network-  is part ofa larger  This  paper  - a  product  of Macroeco-
sidized foods, and by focusing  subsidies on  effort in the network  to identify the impact  nomics  and  Growth,  Development  Re-
foods consumed  more by the poor than  by  of transfer  programs  on the urban  and ru-  search  Group-  is part  of a larger  effort
the rich - like coarse baladi bread -Egyp-  ral poor. Copies of the paper  are available  in the group  to understand  financial  de-
tianpolicymakers  have found a way to self-  free from the World Bank,  1818 H Street  velopment  and financial  integration.  Cop-
target food subsidies to the urban poor. Yet  NW, Washington,  DC 20433.  Please  con-  ies ofthe paper  are available  free from the
because the rural poor do not consume  as  tact  Moira  Coleridge-Taylor,  room MC4-  World Bank,  1818 H Street NW, Washing-
much  baladi  bread, this  system  is not as  554, telephone 202-473-3704, fax 202-522-  ton,  DC  20433.  Please  contact  Emily
well-targeted to the rural poor.  3283,  email  address  mcoleridgetaylor  Khine, room MC3-341, telephone  202-473-
@worldbank.org. Policy Research Working  7471,  fax  202-522-3518,  email  address
The  Egyptian  food subsidy  system  is  an  Papers  are also posted on the Web atwww.  kkhine@worldbank,org.  Policy  Research
untargetedsystemthatisessentiallyopento  worldbank.org/research/workingpapers.  Working  Papers  are  also  posted  on the
all Egyptians. Forthis  reason, the budgetary  The  author  may  be contacted  at  radams  Web  at  www.worldbank.orglresearch/
costs of this system have been high and the  @worldbank.org.  (42 pages)  workingpapers.  The authors  may be con-
ability of this system to improve the welfare  tacted  at  sschmukler@&worldbank.org  or
status  of the poor has been questioned.  vesperon@wam.umd.edu.  (67 pages)
Since the food riots of 1977, Egyptian  2323.Globalization  and Firms'
policymakers  have been reluctant to make  Financing  Choices:  Evidence
large changes in their  food subsidy sys-  from Emerging Economies  2324. Give Growth and
tem. Rather, their  strategy has  been to  Macroeconomic  Stability in Russia
reduce the costs and coverage of this  sys-  Sergio Schmukler and Esteban Vesperoni  a Chance:  Harden  Budgets  by
tem gradually. For example, since 1980  (April  2000)  Eliminating  Nonpayments
policymakers  have reduced  the number  of
subsidized  foods from  20 to just  four.  Debt-equity  ratios do not tend  to increase  Brian Pinto, Vladimir Drebentsov,
Despite  these  cutbacks,  Adams  uses  after financial  liberalization,  but  there is  and Alexander Morozov
new 1997 household  survey  data  to show  a shift from  long-term  to short-term  debt.  (April 2000)
that  the Egyptian  food subsidy  system  is  Globalization  has uneven effects for firms
self-targeted to the poor, because it sub-  with and without access to international  In Russia, implicitsubsidies amounting to
sidizes "inferior" goods. In urban Egypt,  capital markets.  Countries with  deeper  10percent of GDPperyear in the form of
for instance, the main subsidized food  - domestic financial  markets are less af-  nonpayments  have stifled growth, contrib-
coarse baladi bread - is consumed more  fected by financial liberalization.  uted to the August  1998 macroeconomic
by the  poor (the lowest  quintile  group  of  crisis through  their impact  on public  debt,
the population)  than  by the rich (the high-  Schmukler  and  Vesperoni  investigate  and made at best a questionable  contribu-
est quintile).  So subsidizing  baladi bread  whether  integration  with  global markets  tion to equity. Hardening  budgets requires
is a  good way  of improving  the  welfare  affects the financing  choices of firms from  that  these nonpayments  - or mutual  ar-
status  of  the  urban  poor.  But  in  rural  East Asia and Latin America.  Using firm-  rears and  noncash settlements  among the
Egypt where  the  poor do not consume  so  level data  for the  1980s and  1990s, they  government,  the energy  monopolies,  and
much baladi  bread,  the  poor receive  less  study  how leverage  ratios,  the  structure  manufacturing  firms  - be  eliminated
in income  transfers  than  the rich.  of debt maturity,  and sources offinancing  with  energy  bills,  taxes  and  budgetary
In many  countries,  administrative  tar-  change  when  economies  are  liberalized  spending  settled  on time  and  in cash.
geting  of food subsidies can do a better job  and  when  firms  gain  access  to interna-
of targeting  the  poor  than  self-targeting  tional  equity  and  bond markets.  Pinto,  Drebentsov,  and  Morozov analyze
systems.  In  Jamaica,  for  example,  poor  The  evidence  shows  that  integration  the links  between  Russia's  disappointing
people get food stamps  at health  clinics, so  with world financial  markets  has  uneven  growth  performance  in the  second half of
the Jamaican  poor receive double  the in-  effects.  the 1990s, its costly and unsuccessful  sta-
come transfers  from food subsidies that  the  On the one hand,  debt  maturity  for the  bilization,  the macroeconomic  meltdown
Egyptian poor receive. But starting a compa-  average  firm  shortens  when  countries  of  1998,  and  the  spectacular  rise  of
rable system in Egypt would be costly both in  undertake  financial  liberalization.  nonpayments.
financial and political terms, because many  On the other  hand,  domestic  firms that  Nonpayments  flourished  in an environ-
nonpoor households currently receiving food  actually  participate  in international  mar-  ment  of fundamental  inconsistency  be-
subsidies would have to be excluded.  kets  get  better  financing  opportunities  tween  a macroeconomic  policy geared  at
For these  reasons,  it is likely  that  the  and extend  their  debt  maturity.  sharp  disinflation  and  a microeconomic
government  will  continue  to  refine  the  Moreover,  firms  in  economies  with  policy of bailing  enterprises  out through
present  food subsidy  system,  perhaps  by  deeper  domestic  financial  systems  are  soft budget  constraints.Policy  Research  Working  Paper  Series  11
Heavy untargeted  implicit  subsidies  on commercial bank  activities. Regula-  commerce because mixing them will in-
flowing  through the nonpayments system  tions that restrict banks' ability to engage  crease financial fragility.
(amounting to 10 percent of GDP annu-  in securities activities and to own nonfi-  * On average, greater state ownership
ally) have stifled growth, contributed to  nancial firms are closely associated with  of banks tends to be associated with more
the August 1998  meltdown through their  more  instability in the banking sector.  And  poorly developed banks, nonbanks, and
impact on public debt, and have made at  keeping commercial banks from engaging  stock markets and more poorly function-
best a questionable  contribution to equity.  in investment  banking,  insurance, and  ing financial systems.
Dismantling this system must be a top  real estate activities does not appear to  This paper  - a  product of Finance,
priority, along with promoting enterprise  produce  positive benefits.  Development Research Group - is part
restructuring  and growth (by hardening  of a larger effort in the group to examine
budget  constraints)  and  medium-term  Barth, Caprio, and Levine report cross-  the effects of financial sector regulation.
macroeconomic  stability (by reducing the  country data on commercial bank regula-  Copies  of the paper are available free from
size of subsidies).  tion and ownership in more  than 60 coun-  the  World Bank,  1818 H  Street  NW,
Getting  the  government  out  of the  tries.  They evaluate  the  links  between  Washington, DC 20433. Please contact
nonpayments system means settling all  different regulatory/ownership practices  Agnes Yaptenco,  room MC3-446, tele-
appropriately controlled  budgetary expen-  in  those  countries  and  both  financial  phone  202-473-1823, fax 202-522-1155,
ditures on time and in cash, and eschew-  sector performance and banking system  email address ayaptenco@worldbank.org.
ing spending arrears, thereby setting an  stability.  Policy  Research Working Papers are also
example for enterprises  and  laying the  They  document substantial variation in  posted on the Web at www.worldbank.org/
groundwork for eliminating tax offsets at  response to these questions: Should it be  research/workingpapers.  The  authors
all levels of government, and insisting on  public policy to limit the powers of com-  may  be  contacted  at  jbarth@business.
cash tax payments.  mercial banks to engage in securities, in-  auburn.edu,  gcaprio@worldbank.org,  or
To  stop energy-related subsidies would  surance, and real estate activities?  Should  rlevine@csom.umn.edu.  (60 pages)
require not only  that the government pay  the mixing of banking and comrnerce be
its own energy bills on time and in cash,  restricted  by  regulating  commercial
but also that  the  energy monopolies be  bank's  ownership of nonfinancial firms  2326. How Urban Concentration
empowered to disconnect nonpaying cli-  and nonfinancial firms'ownership of  com-  Affects Economic Growth
ents. This will enable the government to  mercial banks? Should states  own com-
insist that the energy monopolies  in turn  mercial banks, or should those banks be  Vernon  Henderson
pay their own taxes in full and on time.  privatized?  (April  2000)
This paper-  a product of the Econom-  They find:
ics Unit, World Bank Office, Moscow - *  There is no reliable statistical rela-  If  urban overconcentration really  is an
was produced as part of the Economic  and  tionship between restrictions on commer-  issue, it ought to affect economic growth
Sector  Work Program, Poverty Reduction  cial banks' ability to engage in securities,  rates in a robust, consistent fashion. And
and Economic  Management Sector Unit,  insurance,  and  real estate  transactions  it does.  Not only is there  an optimal degree
Europe and Central Asia Region. Copies  and a) how well-developed the banking  of urban concentration that varies with
of the paper are available free from the  sector is, b) how well-developed  securities  country  income, but departures from opti-
World Bank, 1818 H Street, NW, Wash-  markets and nonbank financial interme-  mal  concentration result in substantial
ington, DC 20433. Please contact Helena  diaries are, or c)  the degree of industrial  growth losses. Overconcentrated  countries
Makarenko, room H4-304, telephone 202-  competition. Based on the evidence, it is  can reduce concentration by investing in
458-7832, fax  202-522-2753, email  ad-  difficult  to argue confidently  that restrict-  interregional transport infrastructure -
dress  hmakarenko@worldbank.org.  Policy  ing commercial  banking activities  benefits  in particular,  increasing the density  of
Research Working  Papers are also posted  -or  harms - the development of finan-  road networks.
on the  Web at  www.worldbank.org/re-  cial and securities markets or industrial
search/workingpapers. The authors may  competition.  Henderson  explores the  issue of urban
be contacted at bpinto2@worldbank.org,  a There  are  no positive effects from  overconcentration econometrically,  using
vdrebentsov@worldbank.org,  or amorozov  mixing banking and commerce.  data from a panel of 80 to 100 countries
@worldbank.org.  (27 pages)  * Countries that more tightly restrict  every 5 years from 1960  to 1995.  He finds
and  regulate  the securities  activities of  the following:
commercial  banks are substantially more  * At any level of development there is
2325. Banking  Systems Around  the  likely to suffer a  major banking  crisis.  indeed a best  degree of national  urban
Globe: Do Regulation  and  Countries whose national regulations in-  concentration. It increases sharply as in-
Ownership  Affect Performance  hibit banks'ability to engage in securities  come rises, up to a per capita income of
and Stability?  underwriting, brokering, and dealing - about $5,000 (Penn World  table purchas-
and all aspects of the mutual fund busi-  ing parity income), before declining mod-
James R. Barth,  Gerard  Caprio,  Jr.,  ness - tend to have more fragile finan-  estly.  The best  degree of concentration
and Ross  Levine  cial systems.  declines with country scale. Growth losses
(April  2000)  *  The mixingofbanking and commerce  from significantly nonoptimal concentra-
is associated with less financial stability.  tion are large. Those losses tend  to rise
Empirical results highlight the downside  The evidence does not support admoni-  with level of development, peaking at a
of imposing  certain regulatory restrictions  tions to restrict the mixing of  banking and  very high level (about 1.5  annual percent-12  Policy Research Working Paper Series
age points of economic growth). Results  2327. How the Republic of Korea's  This paper - a product of the Macro-
are very robust.  Financial  Structure Affects the  economic  Data Team, Development Data
* In a group of 72 countries in 1990,  Volatility of Four Asset Prices  Group - is part of a larger effort in the
roughly  30  have  satisfactory  urban  group to understand  the financial struc-
concentration, 24 have excessive concen-  Hong  G.  Min  and Jong-goo  Park  ture  of  developing countries  based  oII
tration,  and  5 to 16 countries have  too  (April  2000)  empirical data.  Copies of the paper  are
little.  available free from the World Bank, 1818
* The list of countries with highly ex-  HowKorea'sfinancial structureaffects the  H  Street  NW, Washington,  DC 20433.
cessive  concentration includes Argentina,  volatility ofKorea's  real effective  exchange  Please contact Premi Rathan-Raj,  room
Chile, Costa Rica, and Panama (in Latin  rate, money market rate,government bond  MC2-742, telephone  202-473-3705, fax
America); the  Republic  of  Korea  and  yields, and stock  prices.  202-522-3645, email address prathanraj
Thailand  (in  Asia): Congo (in  Africa);  @worldbank.org. Policy Research Work-
and  Greece, Ireland,  and  Portugal  (in  Min and Park explore how Korea's finan-  ing Papers are also posted on the Web at
Europe). Many of these  countries have  cial structure  affects the volatility of as-  w w w. world  bank  .org/research  /
explicitly  unitary  governments or federal  set prices.  Documented empirical  evidence  workingpapers. The authors  may be coII-
structures  have  traditionally  been  of  the  relationship  between  financial  tacted  at  hmin56@aol.com or  jpark
severely constrained.  structure  and financial crisis sheds light  @worldbank.org.  (33 pages)
* The list of countries with too little  on the relationship  between asset  price
urban-  concentration includes Belgium (a  volatility - extreme variations in prices
small,  split  country)  and  special cases  --  and financial structure.  And the vola-  2328. Social Transfers and Social
such as Czechoslovakia and the  former  tility of financial and nonfinancial asset  Assistance: An Empirical Analysis
Yugoslavia.  prices provides an indirect link between  Using Latvian Household Survey
* Urban  concentration  declines with  an economy's financial structure and the  Data
national  scale. It initially rises  with in-  likelihood of financial crisis.
come, then peaks at a per capita income  Using time-series data and a set of in-  Branko  Milanovic
of about $3,000, before declining. If the  dicators measuring  financial  structure,  (April  2000)
largest city  in a country  is a port, increased  Min  and Park examine how Korea's finan-
trade leads to increased urban concentra-  cial structure  affects the volatility of the  In Latvia, only 1.5 percent of households
tion. Otherwise, increased trade leads to  real  effective exchange rate,  the money  receive  social assistance, which for those
deconcentration as markets in the hinter-  market rate, government bond yields, and  households represents 20 percent of in-
land open  lp  to trade. But trade effects  are  stock prices. They find:  come. The allocation of social assistance
modest.  *  There is a stable long-term relation-  is unequal. Urban households outside the
* Similarly, more political decentrali-  ship between financial structure and vola-  capital (Riga) and those headed by male
zation (or  increased federalism) onlymod-  tility in the real effective exchange rate,  adults  are systematically "discriminated
estly reduces urban concentration.  the money market rate, stock prices, and  against." Because social assistance is lo-
However,  interregional transport infra-  the yield on government housing bonds.  cally financed, poor households in differ-
structure  - especialiy dense road net-  *  Financialstructureaffectsassetprice  ent  parts  of  the  country  are  treated
works  ---  significantly  reduce  urban  variables asymmetrically. Some  variables'  unequally.
concentration, an  effect that  rises with  volatility increases and others' diminish,
income.  suggesting that monetary policies should  Milanovic assesses  the  performance  of
This paper --  a product of Infrastruc-  target different asset markets to achieve  Latvia's system of social  transfers, in three
ture and Environment, Development Re-  different goals.  If the goal of  the monetary  ways:
search Group --- is part of a larger effort  authority  is to stabilize the money mar-  First,  he analyzes  the incidence (who
in the group to  analyze the role of  economic  ket rate,  fbr example, intervening in the  receives transfers) of pensions, family al-
geography and urbanization in the devel-  banking sector is more efficient than in-  lowances, unemployment  benefits,  and
opment process,  particularly as influenced  tervening in other financial subsectors.  social  assistance.  Per  capita  analysis
by infrastructure  investment  and politi-  *  The higher volatility of stock prices  shows pensions tending to be pro-rich and
cal decentralization. Copies of the paper  reflects the thin stock market in Korea.  families  allowances pro-poor (a finding
are available free from the World Bank,  * The stability of the yield on govern-  typical in poverty analyses). Introducing
1818  H  Street  NW,  Washington,  DC  ment housing bonds reflects the Korean  an equivalence scale alters the results and
20433. Please contact Roula  Yazigi, room  government's  policy of  stabilizing  the  shows  all  individual  cash  transfers
MC2-337, telephone  202-473-7176, fax  nation's housing supply by isolating the  performing about the  same: mildly pro-
202-522-0056,  email  address  ryazigi  housingmarketfrom the impactofKorea's  poor.
@worldbank.org.  Policy Research Work-  financial structure.  Next, he examines the performance of
ing Papers are also posted on the Web at  *  Restrictions on foreigners' ownership  social assistance,  which is, by definition,
w w w. w o r l  d b a n k. o r g/ r e s e a r c h /  of domestic stock in Korea during the pe-  directed  to  the  poor.  He  shows  that
workingpapers. The author may be con-  riod analyzed, and the fact that most capi-  Latvia's current system is concentrated-
tacted at vernon_hendersonC@brown.edu.  tal flows  through commercial  banks, affect  meaning  that  social  assistance  is dis-
(42 pages)  the exchange rate, which is deternined  (at  bursed to few households (only 1.5  percent
least in the short run) by capital flows in  of all households receive it) but  among
the foreign exchange market.  those  that  do receive it,  it represents  aPolicy Research Working  Paper Series  13
relatively  high  share  (20 percent)  of in-  World War  II and prevalent  in the  1950s  2330. Reducing Structural
come. Households  that  are systematically  and  1960s)  still  governs  Russia.  In  this  Dominance  and Entry
"discriminated  against"  in the  allocation  paradigm  there  are only two reasons  for  Barriers in Russian  Industry
of social assistance  are urban  households  foreign direct investment:  access to inputs
living outside  the capital  (Riga) and those  for production  and  access to markets  for  Harry G. Broadman
headed  by male  adults.  outputs.  Such  kinds  of foreign  direct  in-  (May 2000)
Third,  he  looks at  the  regional  alloca-  vestment,  although  beneficial,  are  often
tion of social assistance.  The results  con-  based  on generating  exports  that  exploit  The absence of new business  in Russia  is
firm  earlier  findings  of large  horizontal  cheap  labor  or natural  resources  or  are  striking.  Reforms  to make  Russia  more
inequalities  - that  people with the same  aimed at penetrating  protected  local mar-  competitive  should  start  with eliminating
income  from different  parts  of the  coun-  kets,  not  necessarily  at world  standards  regulatory and  institutional  barriers to the
try  are  treated  unequally,  because  the  for price and quality.  entry of new competitors.
existing  system  is based  on local financ-  They contend  that  Russia should phase
ing of social assistance.  outhigh  tariffs  and nontariffprotection  for  Many  industrial  firms  in  Russia  have
This paper  - a product  of Poverty  and  the domestic market,  most tax preferences  undergone  changes in ownership,  but rela-
Human  Resources,  Development  Re-  for foreign investors  (which don't increase  tively  few  have  been  competitively  re-
search  Group - is part  of the Latvia  Pov-  foreign  direct  investment  but  do reduce  structured.  Using  survey and other  data,
erty Assistance  Report  (February  2000).  fiscal revenues),  and many restrictions  on  Broadman  suggests  that  much of Russian
Copies ofthis  paper are available  free from  foreign direct  investment.  industry  is immune  from robust  competi-
the  World  Bank,  1818  H  Street,  NW,  They recommend  that  Russia  switch to  tion because  of heavy vertical integration,
Washington,  DC  20433.  Please  contact  a modern  approach  to foreign  direct  in-  geographic segmentation,  and the concen-
Patricia  Sader,  room MC3-556, telephone  vestment  by:  tration  of buyers  and  sellers  in  selected
202-473-3902,  fax  202-522-1153,  email  *  Amending  the newly enacted  foreign  markets.
address  psader@worldbank.org.  Policy  direct investrnent  law so that  it will grant  Moreover,  regulatory  constraints  pro-
Research  Working Papers  are also posted  nondiscriminatory  "national  treatment"  to  tect  incumbent  firms  from  competition
on  the  Web  at  www.worldbank.org/  foreign investors forboth  right ofestablish-  with  new  entrants,  both  domestic  and
research/workingpapers.  The author  may  ment  and  post-establishment  operations,  foreign.
be  contacted  at  bmilanovic@worldbank.  abolish  conditions  (such  as  local content  Broadman  sketches  a reform  agenda for
org. (30 pages)  restrictions)  inconsistent  with  the World  Russia's  post-privatization  program,
Trade  Organization  agreement  on trade-  which  emphasizes  the  restructuring  of
related investment  measures  (TRIMs), and  anti-competitive  structures  and the reduc-
2329. Improving  Russia's  make  investor-state  dispute  resolution  tion of barriers  to entry.  Broadman's  pro-
Policy on Foreign Direct  mechanisms  more efficient (giving foreign  posed  reform  agenda  calls  broadly  for
Investment  investors  the chance to seek neutral  bind-  strengthening  Russia's  nascent  rules-
ing international  arbitration,  for example).  based framework  for competition  policy to
Joel Bergsman, Harry G. Broadman,  *  Strengthening  enforcement  of prop-  reduce discretion,  increase  transparency,
and Vladimir Drebentsov  erty rights.  and improve  accountability.
(May 2000)  *  Simplifying  registration  procedures  This paper  - a product  of the Poverty
for foreign investors,  to make them trans-  Reduction  and  Economic  Management
Russia gets  relatively  little foreign  direct  parent  and  rules-based.  Sector  Unit,  Europe  and  Central  Asia
investment  and almost  none of the newer,  *  Extending  guarantee  schemes cover-  Regional Office-is  part  of alarger  effort
more efficient kind,  involving  state-of-the-  ing basic  noncommercial  risks.  in the  region  to assess  structural  reform
art technology and world-class competitive  This paper  - a product  of the Poverty  in Russia.  Copies  of the paper  are  avail-
production  linked  to  dynamic  global  or  Reduction  and  Economic  Management  able free  from  the  World  Bank,  1818 H
regional markets.  Why?And  what should  Sector Unit, Europe  and Central  Asia Re-  Street  NW,  Washington,  DC  20433.
be done about  it?  gionalOffice-ispartofalargereffortin  Please  contact  Sandra  Craig,  room H4-
the region  to assist  the  Russian  authori-  166, telephone  202-473-3160, fax 202-522-
Foreign  direct  investment  brings  host  ties in preparing  for accession to the World  2753,  email  address  scraig
countries  capital,  productive  facilities,  Trade  Organization.  Copies of the paper  @worldbank.org.  Policy Research  Work-
and  technology  transfers  as  well  as em-  are  available  free from the  World  Bank,  ing Papers  are also posted  on the Web at
ployment.  new job  skills,  and  manage-  1818  H  Street  NW,  Washington,  DC  www.worldbank  org/research/
ment  expertise.  It  is  important  to  the  20433. Please contact Sandra  Craig, room  workingpapers.  The  author  may  be  con-
Russian  Federation,  where incentives  for  H4-166, telephone  202-473-3160, fax 202-  tacted  athbroadman@worldbank.org.  (18
competition  are limited  and incentives  to  522-2753,  email  address  scraig  pages)
becoming efficient are blunted  by interre-  @worldbank.org.  Policy Research  Work-
gional  barriers  to  trade,  weak  creditor  ing Papers  are also posted  on the Web at
rights,  and administrative  barriers  to new  w w w. w o r l d b a n k.  o r g / r e s e a r c h /
entrants.  workingpapers.  The authors  may be con-
Bergsman,  Broadman,  and Drebentsov  tacted  at  hbroadman@worldbank.org  or
argue  that  the old policy paradigm  of for-  vdrebentsov@worldbank.org.  (21 pages)
eign direct investment  (established  before14  Policy Research Working  Paper Series
2331.  Competition,  Corporate  *  Making the authority responsible for  banks, merchant  banking  corporations)
Governance,  and  Regulation  competition and regulatory policymaking  and another group of tiny mutual savings
in Central  Asia:  Uzbekistan's  into an independent agency - a "cham-  and finance companies.
Structural  Reform  Challenges  pion" of competition  - answerable  di-  Both the too-big-to-fail  doctrine and the
rectly to the prime minister.  credit channel approach suggest that  the
Harry G.  Broadman  * Strengthening  incentives and insti-  probability of  distress would  be greater for
(May  2000)  tutions  for  corporate  governance  and  small intermediaries. But Bongini,  Ferri,
bringing them in line with international  and Kang find that proportionately fewer
Like  many  Central  Asian  republics,  practice.  small intermediaries were distressed than
Uzbekistan  has adopted  agradual, cautious  * Subjecting infrastructure monopolies  were large intermediaries.
approach in  its  transition to a  market  to systemic competitive  restructuring and  They offer two hypothetical  explana-
economy.  It has had some  success  attaining  unbundling, where appropriate. For other  tions for this unexpected result:
macroeconomic stability,  but  microeco-  utilities,  depoliticize tariff  setting  and  *  Exchange rate  exposure - a major
nomic reforms  have lagged  behind.  It is time  implementation  of  regulations;  ensure  shock to Korean intermediaries  - was
to accelerate  structural reform.  that  price, output, and investment deci-  presumably negligible  for the small finan-
sions  by  service  suppliers  are  pro-  cial intermediaries.
In Uzbekistan state enterprises are being  competitive (creating a level playing field  *  Small financial intermediaries  allo-
changed  into  shareholding  companies,  among users); and increase transparency  cated loans better,  because of the "peer
and  private  enterprises  account for 45  and accountability to the public.  monitoring" natural  to their  mutual na-
percent of all registered firms. But busi-  This paper - a product of the Poverty  ture and deep local roots.
ness decisions to set prices, output,  and  Reduction  and  Economic Management  Available data did not allow  the authors
investment  are often not market-based,  Sector Unit,  Europe  and  Central  Asia  to test the  first hypothesis, but they did
nor  wholly within  the  purview of busi-  Regional  Office - is part  of a  larger  find support for the second one. Estimat-
nesses,  especially  those  in  commercial  effort in the region to assess  structural  ing a logit model, they find that the prob-
manufacturing  and services.  reform in Central Asia. Copies of the pa-  ability  of  distress  was  systematically
Lines of authority for corporate gover-  per  are  available  free from  the  World  smaller  for the  mutual  savings and  fi-
nance - from state enterprises to private  Bank, 1818  H Street NW, Washington,  DC  nance  companies that  stayed  closer to
enterprises  - are ill-defined, so there is  20433.  Please contact Sandra Craig, room  their origins  (for example, collecting  many
little discipline on corporate performance  H4-166,  telephone 202-473-3160,  fax 202-  deposits as  "credit mutual  installment
and little separation between government  522-2753,  email  address  scraig  savings") and for those with a longer his-
and business.  @worldbank.org. Policy Research Work-  tory  of  doing  business  in  their  local
Nascent frameworks have been created  ing Papers are also posted on the Web at  community.
forcompetitionpolicy(forfirmsinthecom-  www.  worldbank.  org/research/  This  paper  - a  product  of Finance,
mercial sector) and regulatory policy  (gov-  workingpapers. The author may be con-  Development Research Group - is part
erning utilities in the infrastructure  mo-  tacted at hbroadman@worldbank.org.  (21  of a larger effort in the group to study the
nopoly sector). But  implementation and  pages)  financial crises in East Asia. Copies  of the
enforcement have been hampered by old-  paper are available free from the World
style instruments (such as price controls)  Bank, 1818  H Street NW,  Washington, DC
rooted in central  planning, by lack of a  2332.  Financial  Intermediary  20433. Please contact Kari Labrie, room
strong independent regulatory rule-mak-  Distress  in  the Republic  MC3-456, telephone  202-473-1001, fax
ing authority, by the limited understand-  of Korea:  Small  Is Beautiful?  202-522-1155,  email  address  klabrie
ing ofthe basic  concepts  ofcompetition  and  @worldbank.org. Policy Research Work-
regulatory  reform,  and  by weak  institu-  Paola Bongini, Giovanni Ferri,  ing  Papers  are also  posted  on the  Web at
tional  capabilities for analyzing market  andTae SooKang  www.worldbank.org/research/
structure and business performance.  (May  2000)  workingpapers. The authors  may be con-
Based  on  fieldwork  in  Uzbekistan,  tacted  at  pbongini@mi.unicatt.it, gferri
Broadman recommends:  During a systemic financial crisis in Ko-  @worldbank.org, or  tkangC@worldbank.
* Deepening senior policy officials'  un-  rea, the probability of financial  distress  org. (35 pages)
derstanding  of, and  appreciation  of the  was greater for large financial intermedi-
benefits from, enterprise competition and  aries (such  as commercial  banks and mer-
how it affects economic  growth.  chant banking corporations) than it was  2333. Output  Fluctuations  in
* Reforming  competition  policy  institu-  for  tiny  mutual  savings  and  finance  Latin  America:  What  Explains
tions and legal frameworks  in line with the  companies.  the Recent  Slowdown?
country's goal of strengthening structural
reforms and  improving macroeconomic  Taking  the  Korean  experience  as  a  Santiago  Herrera, Guillermo  Perry,
policy.  laboratoryexperimentin systemic  financial  and Neile  Quintero
* Improving the ability of government  crisis,  Bongini,  Ferri, and Kang analyze  dis-  (May  2000)
and  associated  institutions  to  assess  tress in individual institutions among two
Uzbekistan's industrial market structure  groups of financial intermediaries.  For the period 1992-98, domestic factors
and the determinants  of enterprise  con-  They pool together a group of large fi-  explain most output variability in Latin
duct and performance.  nancial  intermediaries  (commercial  America.  However, external factors  ac-Policy Research Working  Paper Series  15
count for about 60  percent of the 1998-99  2334.  Sex  Workers and the Cost  2335.  Inflation and the Poor
slowdown -perhaps  in part because ex-  of Safe  Sex:  The Compensating
ternal variables were more  volatile during  Differential  for Condom  Use  in  William Easterly and Stanley Fischer
this period,  but  mainly  because domestic  Calcutta  (May 2000)
variables  - real  interest  rates  and  real
exchange rates-  were more stable in these  Viayendra  Rao, Indrani Gupta,  The poor suffer  more from  inflation  than
two years.  and Smarajit Jana  the  rich  do,  reveals  this  survey  of poor
(May 2000)  people  in 38 countries.
Herrera,  Perry,  and  Quintero  explain  Prostitution  is often called the world's old-
Latin  America's  growth  slowdown  in  est  profession, yet economists  almost never  Using polling data for 31,869 households
1998-99. To do so, they use two comple-  study it. The practice of safe sex by com-  in 38 countries and allowing for country
mentary methodologies.  mercial sex workers is considered central  effects,  Easterly and Fischer show  that the
The first aims at determining how much  to  preventing the transmission of  AIDS in  poor are more likely than the rich to men-
of the slowdown can be explained by spe-  developing countries -yet  sex workers in  tion inflation as a top.national  concern.
cific  external  factors: the terms of trade,  Calcutta who regularly use condoms suf-  This result  survives  several robustness
international  interest  rates,  spreads  on  fer a 79 percent  loss in t4eir average earn-  checks.
external debt, capital flows, and climato-  ings per sex act.  Also, direct measures of improvements
logical factors (El Ninio).  Using quarterly  in well-being  for the poor  - the change in
GDP data for the eight largest countries  The practice of safe sex by commercial sex  their  share  of national  income, the per-
in the region, the authors estimate  a dy-  workers is considered central to prevent-  centage  decline  in  poverty,  and  the
namic panel showing that  50-60 percent  ing the transmission of AIDS in develop-  percentage  change in the real minimum
of the slowdown was due to these exter-  ing countries. Rao, Gupta, and Jana esti-  wage  - are negatively correlated with in-
nal factors.  mate  the  compensating differential  for  flation in pooled cross-country samples.
The second approach allows for effects  condom  use  among  sex  workers  in  High inflation tends to lower the share
on output by some endogenous variables,  Calcutta, based on results from a survey  of the bottom quintile and the real mini-
such as domestic real interest  rates  and  conducted in 1993.  mum  wage  - and  tends  to  increase
real exchange  rates. Using monthlyindus-  If, as suggested by anecdotal evidence,  poverty.
trial  production data,  the  authors  esti-  this loss in income is large, it would indi-  This paper - a joint product of Macro-
mate country-specific generalized vector  cate the existence of strong disincentives  economics  and Growth, Development Re-
autoregressions  (GVAR)  for the  largest  for practicing safe sex.  search Group, and the International Mon-
countries.  To identify  the  relationship  between  etary Fund - is part of a larger effort to
They find that during the sample period  condom use and the average price per sex  study the effects of macroeconomic  poli-
(1992-98) output volatility is mostly as-  act, they follow  an instrumental  variable  cies on growth and poverty. Copies  of this
sociated with shocks to domestic factors,  approach, exploiting an intervention pro-  paper are  available free from the World
but the slowdown  in the subperiod 1998-  gram focused on providing information  Bank, 1818 H Street, NW, Washington,
99 is explained more than  60 percent by  about the AIDS virus and about safe sex  DC 20433. Please contact  Kari Labrie,
shocks to the external factors.  practices.  The  program,  instituted  in  room MC3-456, telephone 202-473-1001,
This paper - a product of  the Economic  1992, was  not  systematically  adminis-  fax 202-522-1155, email address klabrie
Policy  Sector  Unit and the Poverty Reduc-  tered.  @worldbank.org. Policy Research Work-
tion and  Economic Management  Sector  Using this method, they found that sex  ing Papers are also posted on the Web at
Unit,  Latin  America  and  Caribbean  workers who always use condoms face a  w w w. w o r l d b a n k. o r g  / r e s e a r c h /
Regional Office  - is part of a larger effort  loss of 79 percent in the average earnings  workingpapers. William Easterly may be
to  understand  output  fluctuations  and  per sex act.  contacted  at  weasterly(worldbank.org.
growth  in  the  region.  Copies  of  the  This paper - a product of Poverty and  (31 pages)
paper are available free from the World  Human  Resources,  Development  Re-
Bank, 1818 H Street  NW, Washington,  search Group - is part of a larger  effort
DC  20433.  Please  contact  Cristina  in the group to understand  the behavior  2336. Endogenous  Enforcement
Palarca, room I8-165, telephone 202-473-  underlying HIV/AIDS  transmission. Cop-  and  Effectiveness  of China's
5328, fax 202-522-2119, email  address  ies of  the paper are available free from the  Pollution  Levy  System
cpalarca@worldbank.org.  Policy  Research  World  Bank, 1818 H Street NW,  Washing-
Working  Papers  are  also  posted  on  ton,  DC 20433. Please contact  Patricia  Hua  Wang  and David  Wheeler
the Web at www.worldbank.org/researchl  Sader, room MC3-556,  telephone 202-473-  (May  2000)
workingpapers.  The  authors  may  be  3902, fax 202-522-1153, email  address
contacted  at  gperry@worldbank.org or  psader@worldbank.org. Policy Research  How well air and water pollution regula-
nquintero@worldbank.org.  (62 pages)  Working Papers  are  also posted on the  tion is implemented depends very much on
Web  at  www.worldbank.org/research/  both the level of economic development  and
workingpapers.  Vijayendra  Rao  may  be  actual  environmental  quality.  Pollution
contacted  at  vrao@worldbank.org.  (18  pricing  is closer to the dictates  of environ-
pages)  mental  economics  than  China's  formal
regulatory  statutes  would  suggest  - and
there is considerable  scope for  using  eco-16  Policy Research Working Paper Series
nomic instruments to reduce China's in-  a well-documented set ofplant-level data,  while  still modest,  grew rapidly  in the
dustrial pollution problems.  combined with community-level data, to  1990s.
assess the impact of  pollution charges and  Adjusting for market size, much invest-
Wang and  Wheeler investigate  two as-  community  pressure on industrial behav-  ment  stays close to home; adjusting for
pects of China's pollution  levy system,  ior in China.  distance,  much heads toward  the coun-
which was first  implemented  about  20  He constructs and estimates an indus-  tries with the  biggest markets.  Foreign
years ago.  trial  organic water  pollution discharge  direct investment is more geographically
First,  they  analyze what  determines  model  for plants that violate standards for  concentrated than either exports or pro-
differences in enforcement ofthe pollution  pollution discharge,  pay pollution  charges,  duction. Thus U.S. affiliate production in
levy in various urban areas. They  find that  and are constantly under community  pres-  Europe is 7 times U.S. exports to Europe;
collection of the otherwise uniform pollu-  sure to further  abate pollution.  that ratio drops to 4 for  all industrial coun-
tion levy is sensitive to differences in eco-  He creates a model and estimates im-  tries  and to 1.6 for developing countries.
nomic development and  environmental  plicit prices for pollution discharges from  Multinational  activity in high-income
quality. Air and water pollution levies are  community pressure,  which  are  deter-  countries is overwhelningly  horizontal,
higher in areas that are heavily polluted.  mined jointly  by the  explicit price, the  involving production for sale to the host
Second, they analyze the impact of pol-  pollution levy. He finds that the implicit  country market. In developing countries,
lution charges on industry's environmen-  discharge price is at least as high as the  a greater proportion of multinational  ac-
tal performance, in terms of the pollution  explicit price. In other words, community  tivity is 'vertical,'  involving manufactur-
intensity  of process production and  the  pressure  not only exists but may be as  ing at intermediate  stages of production.
degree of end-of-pipe abatement for both  strong an incentive as the pollution charge  Thus only 4 percent of U.S. affiliate pro-
water pollution and air pollution.  is for industrial firms to control pollution  duction in the  European  Union is sold
Econometric  analysis shows that plants  in China.  back to the  United  States,  whereas for
respondstrongly to the levybyeither abat-  Wang's modeling approach  also pro-  developing countries the figure is 18 per-
ing air pollution in the production process  vides a way to estimate the marginal cost  cent, rising to 40 percent for Mexico.  Simi-
or  providing end-of-pipe treatment  for  of polution  abatement. The empirical re-  larly, less than  10 percent of Japan's  af-
water pollution.  sults show that the current marginal cost  filiate production in the EU is sold back
This paper - a product of Infrastruc-  of abatement  is about twice the effective  to Japan,  compared with  more than  20
ture and Environment, Development Re-  charge rate in China.  percent in developing countries.
search Group - is part of a larger effort  This paper - a product of Infrastruc-  In  models of horizontal  activity,  the
in the group to study environmental regu-  ture and Enviromnent, Development Re-  decision to go multinational  is a tradeoff
lation in developing countries. Copies of  search Group - is part of a larger effort  between  the  additional  fixed costs  in-
the  paper  are  available  free  from  the  in the group to study environmental regu-  volved in setting up a new plant and the
World  Bank, 1818  HStreetNW, Washing-  lation in developing countries. Copies of  savings in variable costs (transport costs
ton,  DC 20433. Please  contact Yasmin  the  paper  are  available  free  from  the  and tariffs) on exports. In models ofverti-
D'Souza, room MC2-622, telephone 202-  World  Bank, 1818  H Street NW, Washing-  cal activity,  direct investment is motivated
473-1449, fax 202-522-3230, email  ad-  ton,  DC 20433. Please contact Yasmin  by differences in factor costs. Tariffs and
dress  ydsouza@worldbank.org.  Policy  D'Souza, room MC2-622, telephone 202-  transport  costs both  encourage vertical
Research Working Papers are also posted  473-1449, fax  202-522-3230, email  ad-  multinational activity (by magnifying dif-
on  the  Web at  www.worldbank.org/re-  dress  ydsouza@worldbank.org.  Policy  ferences in factor prices) and discourage
search/workingpapers. The authors  may  Research Working Papers are also posted  it (by making trade between headquarters
be contacted at hwangl@worldbank.orgor  on  the  Web  at  www.worldbank.org/  and an affiliate more expensive).
dwheelerl@worldbank.org. (27 pages)  research/workingpapers. The author may  The major outward investors carry out
be contacted at hwangl@worldbank.org.  much horizontal investment in large mar-
(27 pages)  kets. For U.S. investors, this  means Eu-
2337. Pollution Charges,  rope, especially the United Kingdom;  for
Community  Pressure,  Japan  and Europe, it means the United
and Abatement Cost of  2338. The Geography of  States.  Most EU investments,  however,
Industrial Pollution in China  International Investment  stay within the EU.
The major outward investors carry out
Hua Wang  Howard J. Shatz and Anthony J. Venables  much  of their  vertical  investment  closer
(May  2000)  (May  2000)  to home: the United States, in Mexico;  the
EU, in Central  and Eastern  Europe; Ja-
Community pressure may be as strong an  Multinationals have become  increasingly  pan, in Asia.
incentive for industrial firms  to control  important to the world economy. Overseas  This paper - a product of Trade, De-
pollution in China as pollution levies are.  production by U.S. affiliates is three times  velopment Research Group - is part of a
U.S. exports, for example. Who is invest-  larger effort in the group to study the lo-
Wang evaluates the strength of the effect  ing where, for sales where?  cation of economic activity. Copies of the
that  community pressure  and pollution  paper are  available free from the World
charges have on industrial  pollution con-  Much foreign  direct investment is between  Bank, 1818 H Street NW, Washington,  DC
trol in China and estimates the marginal  high-income  countries, but investment in  20433. Please contact Lili Tabada, room
cost of pollution abatement. He examines  some developing and transition  regions,  MC3-333, telephone  202-473-6896, faxPolicy  Research  Working  Paper  Series  17
202-522-1159,  email  address  Itabada  get  constraints.  In  doing so, the  IBRD  by  expectations  of  depreciation.  They
@worldbank.org. Policy Research Work-  should concentrate on (1) supporting na-  show that  depositors in  Latin  America
ing Papers are also posted on the Web at  tional and local capacity building in those  face  some uncertainty and frictions when
w w w. w o rl db a n k. o rg/r  e s e a r c h/  areas  essential  for  developing  a  making their portfolio decisions.
workingpapers. Anthony J. Venables may  subnational debt market and (2) financ-  They explore the macroeconomic  conse-
be contacted at a.j.venables@lse.ac.uk.  (27  ing  specific subnational  projects  with  quences of a dollarized economy. In par-
pages)  strictly nonrecourse loans.  ticular, they find that, in the presence of
At  the  same time,  the  World Bank  currency substitution, pastbanking  crises
Group  should offer  a variety oflending and  are  good predictors of future  crises. In
2339.  Building  Subnational  Debt  guarantee  instruments  that  encourage  other words, having a highly dollarized
Markets  in Developing  and  private  financing  for  investments  by  economy increases  the  response  of the
Transition  Economies:  subnational  entities - including, for ex-  bankingsystemwhenthereisabadshock,
A Framework  for Analysis,  Policy  ample, equity participation in (or lines of  which halts the outflow of capital. Once
Reform,  and  Assistance  Strategy  credit or partial credit guarantees to) fi-  an economy is in a crisis, however, hav-
nancial  intermediaries  specializing  in  ing more dollar-denominated deposits in
Michel  Noel  subnational  investment  finance  or  in  the banking  system increases the prob-
(May  2000)  funds for financing local infrastructure.  ability of a longer crisis in the future, be-
This paper - a product of the Private  cause it increases exchange rate exposure
Because of the trend toward decentraliza-  and Financial Sectors Development Unit,  in an already weak banking system.
tion in more than 70 countries where the  Europe and Central Asia Region - was  Finally, they show that  the volatility of
World Bank is active, subnational entities  prepared as background for a manual  on  macroeconomic  variables linked to the fi-
- states, regions,  provinces, counties, and  policy issues  relating  to domestic debt  nancial  system increases whenever the
municipalities, and the local utility com-  markets. Copies  ofthis paper are available  economy  becomes more dollarized, which
panies owned by them - are now respon-  free from the World Bank, 1818 H Street  in turn makes the choice of monetary tar-
sible for delivering services and investing  NW, Washington, DC 20433. Please con-  gets more difficult.
in infrastructure. And  infrastructure in-  tact Michel Noel, room  H6-161, telephone  This paper - a product of Poverty Re-
vestments are growing rapidly to meet in-  202-473-2581, fax  202-522-0073, email  duction and Economic  Management Sec-
creasing urban demand. How should the  address  mnoel2@worldbank.org. Policy  tor Unit, East Asia and Pacific Region -
World Bank Group help?  Research Working Papers are also posted  is part of a larger  effort in the region to
on  the  Web at  www.worldbank.org/re-  understand the macroeconomic  effects of
Subnational debt markets can be a pow-  search/workingpapers. (45 pages)  dollarization.  Copies of  the  paper  are
erful force in a  country's  development.  available free from the World Bank, 1818
Through delegated monitoring by finan-  H  Street  NW, Washington,  DC 20433.
cial  intermediaries  and  through  debt  2340.  Currency  Substitution  Please contact Marjorie Puentes, room  I4-
placed  directly  with  investors,  sub-  in Latin  America:  Lessons  from  218,  telephone 202-473-9621,  fax  202-522-
national  debt markets account for about  the  1 990s  2086,  email  address  mpuentes
5 percent of GDP in Argentina and Bra-  @worldbank.org. Policy Research Work-
zil. But they remain embryonic in most  Pere  Gomis-Porqueras,  Carlos  Serrano,  ing Papers are also posted on the Web at
developing and transition economies.  and Alejandro  Somuano  w w w. w o r l d b a n k. o r g / r e s e a r c h /
To  resolve a potential clash  between the  (May  2000)  workingpapers. The authors may be con-
increased financing needs of subnational  tacted at gomis@eco.utexas.edu,  cserrano
entities and  the limited development of  What causes  currency  substitution (foreign  @worldbank.org,  or somuano@eco.utexas.
domestic subnational debt markets,  it is  money substituting for domestic money)?  edu. (31 pages)
critical to support  the orderly,  efficient  What  significance has  it had  in  recent
emergence of such debt markets.  banking crises?  And what is the relation-
As a framework for policy reform, the  ship  between currency conversion and  2341. The  Tyranny  of Concepts:
following steps (mirroring typical weak-  macroeconomic  volatility  in  Latin  CUDIE  (Cumulated,  Depreciated
nesses) are prerequisites for developing a  America?  Investment  Effort)  Is Not  Capital
country's subnational debt market:
* Reducing moral hazard.  Gomis-Porqueras, Serrano, and Somuano  Lant Pritchett
* Improving market transparency.  study how agents in Latin America allo-  (May  2000)
* Strengthening market governance.  cate their  balances  between  dollar-de-
* Establishing  a level playing field.  nominated  and  domestic  currency-de-  Using  the word  capital to represent  two dif-
* Developing  local capacity for account-  nominated  accounts.  They empirically  ferent concepts is not such a problem when
ing,  budgeting,  and  financial  manage-  determine the causes of currency substi-  government is responsible  for only a small
ment.  tution, its significance in recent banking  fraction of national investment and is rea-
In  countries  where  the  government  crises, and the link between currency sub-  sonably effective (as in the United States).
shows a clear commitment to market de-  stitution and volatility in macroeconomic  But when government is a major investor
velopment, says Noel, the  IBRD should  aggregates.  and is ineffective,  the gap between  capital
support the framework needed for policy-  Their findings:  The  ratio ofdollar depos-  and 'cumulative, depreciated investment
based operations that establish hard bud-  its to broad money is strongly influenced  effort"  (CUDIE) may be enormous. A pub-18  Policy Research Working Paper Series
lie sector steel mill may absorb billions as  tacted  at  lpritchett@worldbank.org. (40  tional environment? In Lithuania  com-
an "investment," but if it cannot produce  pages)  mercial  transfer  ofstate property to  private
steel it has zero value as capital.  ouwners  has significantly improved enter-
prises' revenue and export  performance.
The cost of public investment is not the  2342.  What Can We Learn about
value of public capital. Unlike for private  Country  Performance  from  Grigorian presents some evidence of im-
investors, there is no remotely plausible  Conditional  Comparisons  across  proved  corporate  performance  in
behavioral model of the government as  Countries?  Lithuania  for the  period 1995-97. His
investor that  suggests that  every dollar  question: Were these  improvements in
the public sector spends as "investment"  Martin  Ravallion  any  way  caused  by  privatization  and
creates capital in an economic  sense.  (May  2000)  changes in the environment in which en-
This seemingly  obvious  point has so far  terprises operate?
been uniformly  ignored  in the voluminous  Existing  methods  for  assessing  latent  He presents evidence  of correlation be-
empirical literature  on economic  growth,  country or institutional performance can  tween ownership and enterprise  perfor-
which uses, at best, 'cumulated, depreci-  yield deceptive results.  mance  as measured by increased revenues
ated investment effort" (CUDIE) to esti-  and improved export performance. Con-
mate capital stocks.  There have been many attempts to infer  trolling for  preselection bias increases the
But in developing countries especially,  latent  performance attributes  of govern-  magnitude  and  significance of private
the difference  between investment cumu-  ments (or other institutions) from condi-  share ownership,  which  indicates negative
lated at cost and capital value is of pri-  tional  comparisons that  control for ob-  selection bias  at  privatization.  On the
mary empirical importance: government  served  variables. Success  in doing  so could  other hand, (expected) subsidies seem to
investment is half or more of total invest-  greatly improve government  performance.  contribute negatively  to enterprise perfor-
ment. And perhaps  as much as half or  Ravallion critically reviews the econo-  mance. However, the study finds no clear
more  of government investment spending  metric  foundations  ofthe methods  used.  He  evidence of the effect of market competi-
has not created equivalent 'capital."  argues that latent heterogeneity  remains a  tion  on performance  indicators in the short
This suggests that  nearly everything  fundamental  but unresolved  problem.  run.
enmpirical  written in three broad areas is  Locating a benchmark for measuring  Grigorian's is the first study to analyze
misguided.  performance  adds a further problem. Cur-  the  consequences of commercial (as op-
First, none of the estimates of the im-  rent methods do not yield a  consistent  posed to mass) privatization  in Central
pact of public spending identify the pro-  estimate of even the mean latent  perfor-  and Eastern European countries.
ductivity of public capital.  Even where  mance attribute. An assessment of coun-  This paper - a product of the Private
public capital could  be very productive,  re-  try performance by these methods could  and Financial Sectors Development  Sec-
gressions  and evaluations may suggest  well be wildly wrong.  tor Unit, Europe and Central Asia Region
that public investment spending has little  This paper - a product of Poverty and  - is part of a larger effort in the region  to
impact.  Human Resources,  Development  Research  study enterprise  restructuring  in transi-
Second,  everything currently said about  Group-is  part ofa larger  effort  in the group  tion. Copies  ofthe paper are available free
"total factor productivity" in developing  to assess and improve  methods  for  monitor-  from the World Bank, 1818 H Street NW,
countries is deeply  suspect, as there is no  mig  and assessing  country  performance.  The  Washington, DC 20433. Please contact
way empirically to distinguish between  study was funded by the Bank's Research  Darlene Brown, room H6-084, telephone
low  output (or growth) attributable to in-  Support Budget  under the research project  202-473-3542, fax 202-522-0073, email
vestments that  created no 'factors" and  "Policies  for  Poor  Areas"1(RPO  681-39).  Cop-  address  dbrown@worldbank.org. Policy
low  output (or growth)  attributable to low  ies of this paper are available  free  from the  Research Working Papers are also posted
(or slow growth in) productivity in using  World  Bank,  1818HStreetNW,  Washington,  on  the  Web at  www.worldbank.org/re-
accumulated "factors."  DC 20433.  Please contact Patricia Sader,  search/worldngpapers.  The author maybe
Third, multivariate growth regressions  room  MC4-773,  telephone  202-473-3902,  fax  contacted at dgrigorian@worldbank.org.
to date have not, in fact, "controlled"  for  202-522-1153, email  address  psader  (40 pages)
the growth of capital stock, so spurious  Cworldbankorg. Policy  Research  Working
interpretations  have emerged.  Papers are  also posted on  the  Web at
This paper-a  product of Poverty and  w ww .w o rl d ba n k. o r g/res  e a rc h/  2344. Designing Direct  Subsidies
Human  Resources,  Development  Re-  workmngpapers.  Theauthormaybecontacted  for Water and Sanitation Services
search Group - is part of a larger effort  at mravallion@worldbank.org.  (23 pages)  Panama:  A Case Study
in the group to  understand the importance
of  public sector  actions  for  economic  Vivien  Foster,  Andres  G6mez-Lobo,
growth. Copies  of the paper are available  2343. Ownership  and Performance  and Jonathan  Halpern
free from the World Bank, 1818  H Street  of Lithuanian  Enterprises  (May  2000)
NW, Washington, DC 20433. Please con-
tact Retno  Widuri, email address rwiduri  David  A.  Grigorian  An alternative to traditional subsidies for
@worldbank.org.  Policy Research Work-  (May  2000)  water and  sanitation  services is direct
ing Papers are also posted on the Web at  subsidies -fundsgovernmentsprovide  to
w ww .wo rl d b a n k. o rg/re  s e a rc h /  Doesprivate  ownership improve on corpo-  coverpart of the water bill for households
workingpapers. The author may be con-  rate performance in a developing institu-  that meet certain  criteria.  Issues associatedPolicy  Research  Working  Paper  Series  19
with such a subsidy are analyzed through  * The utility or concessionaire can be  vidual households would be preferable to
a case study of Panama.  helpful in identifying eligible candidates  geographically  based targeting.  Empirical
because of its superior information on the  analysis also showed that only a small
As an alternative to traditional  subsidy  payment histories  of customers. It  will  group of very poor households needed a
schemes in utility sectors, direct subsidy  also  have an incentive  to do so, since  it has  subsidy to pay their water bill.
programs have several advantages: they  an interest  in improving poor payment
are  transparent,  they  are  explicit, and  records.  Thought  should  therefore  be  In designing a rational scheme for subsi-
they minimize distortions of the behavior  given at the design stage to the role of  the  dizing water  services, it is important  to
of both the utility and the customers. At  service provider in the implementation of  support the choice of design parameters
the same time, defining practical eligibil-  the subsidy scheme.  with empirical analysis  that simulates the
ity criteria for direct subsidy schemes is  * The administrative agency's respon-  impact of subsidy options on the target
difficult and identifying eligible house-  sibilities, the sources of funding, and the  population.  Otherwise,  there is little guar-
holds may entail substantial administra-  general  principles  guiding the  subsidy  antee that the subsidy program will meet
tive costs.  system should have a clear legal basis,  its objectives.
Foster, G6mez-Lobo,  and Halpern, us-  backed by regulations governing admin-  But  such  analysis  is informationally
ing a  case study from Panama,  discuss  istrative procedures.  demanding. Ideally, researchers  should
some of the  issues associated with the  * To reduce administrative  costs and  have access  to a single, consistent data set
design of direct subsidy systems for wa-  avoid duplication of effort, it would be  containing household-level  information  on
ter services. They conclude  that:  desirable for a single set of institutional  consumption, willingness to pay, and a
*  There is a need to assess - rather  arrangements  to be  used to determine  range  of socioeconomic  characteristics.
than assume - the need for a subsidy. A  eligibility for all welfare and subsidy pro-  Such a comprehensive  data set will  rarely
key test of affordability, and thus of the  grams  in a  given jurisdiction,  whether  exist. G6mez-Lobo,  Foster, and Halpern
need for a subsidy, is to compare the cost  subnational or national.  suggest  overcoming  this data deficiencyby
of the service  with some measure of  house-  This paper - a product of  the Finance,  collating and imaginatively manipulating
hold willingness to pay.  Private Sector, and Infrastructure  Sector  different sources of data to generate esti-
*  The initial  assessment  must  con-  Unit, Latin America and the Caribbean  mates of the missing variables.
sider the affordability  of connection costs  Region  - is part of a larger effort in the  The most valuable sources of informa-
as well as the affordability of the service  region to evaluate and  disseminate les-  tion, they explain, are likely to be the fol-
itself. Connection  costs maybe prohibitive  sons of  experience in designing policies  to  lowing:
for poor households with no credit, sug-  improve the quality and sustainability of  *  Customer  databases  of  the  water
gesting a need to focus subsidies on pro-  infrastructure  services and  to enhance  company, which provide robust informa-
viding access rather than  ongoing  water  access  of the poor to these basic services.  tion on the measured consumption of for-
consumption.  Copies  ofthis paper are available  free  from  mal customers but little information on
* Akeyissueindesigningadirectsub-  the  World Bank,  1818 H  Street  NW,  unmeasured consumption, informal cus-
sidy scheme is its  targeting  properties.  Washington, DC 20433. Please contact  tomers, willingness to pay, or socioeco-
Poverty is a  complex phenomenon and  Silvia Delgado, room 15-196, telephone  nomic variables.
difficult  to  measure.  Eligibility  must  202-473-7840, fax 202-676-1821, email  *  General  socioeconomic household
therefore be based on easily measurable  address sdelgado@worldbank.org.  Policy  surveys, which are an excellent source of
proxy  variables, and good  proxies are hard  Research Working  Papers are also posted  socioeconomic  information  but  tend  to
to find. In choosing  eligibility criteria for  on the  Web at  www.worldbank.org/re-  record water  expenditure  rather  than
a subsidy, it is essential  to verify what  search/workingpapers. The authors may  physical consumption.
proportion  of  the target group fails to meet  be contacted at vfoster@worldbank.org  or  *  Willingness-to-pay surveys,  which
the criteria (errors of exclusion)  and what  jhalpern@worldbank.org. (29 pages)  are generally tailored to a specific  project,
proportion  of nontarget  groups  is inad-  are  very  flexible,  and  may  be  the  only
vertently  eligible for the benefits  (errors  source  of willingness-to-pay  data.  How-
of inclusion).  2345.  Information  and Modeling  ever, they  are expensive to undertake  and
* Administrative costs are roughly the  Issues in Designing  Water and  the information collected is based on hy-
same no matter what  the  level of indi-  Sanitation  Subsidy Schemes  pothetical  rather  than  real  behavior.
vidual  subsidies,  so a scheme  that  pays  Where  such  surveys  are  unavailable,  in-
beneficiaries  very little  will tend  not to be  Andres G6mez-Lobo,  Vivien Foster  ternational  benchmark  values  on willing-
cost-effective. It is important  to determine  Jonathan Halpern  ness to pay may  be used.
what proportion  of total program  costs will  (May 2000)  Combining  data  sets  requires  some ef-
be absorbed  by administrative  expenses.  fort and creativity,  and creates  difficulties
*  Subsidies  should  not  cover  the  full  Evaluating  design  alternatives  is a first  of its own. But once a suitable  data  set has
cost  of the  service  and should  be contin-  step in introducing  optimal  water subsidy  been constructed,  a sirmulation model can
gent  on beneficiaries  paying  their  share  schemes.  The  definition  of appropriate  be created  using simple spreadsheet  soft-
of  the  bill.  Subsidies  for  consumption  targeting criteria and subsidy levels needs  ware.  The model used to design Panama's
above a minimum  subsistence level should  to be supported  by empirical analysis,  gen-  water  subsidy  proposal  addressed  these
be avoided. Subsidies  should  be provided  erally an informationally  demanding  ex-  questions:
long enoughbefore  ehgibility  is reassessed  ercise.  An  assessment  carried  out  in  *  Whatarethetargetingpropertiesofdif-
to avoid "poverty  trap"  problems.  Panama  revealed  that  targeting  indi-  ferent eligibility criteria for the subsidy?20  Policy Research  Working  Paper  Series
* How large should  the  subsidy  be?  ethnicity  - will under-invest  in human  payments  demanded  by the groom's  fam-
*  How much  will the  subsidy  scheme  capital  and infrastructure  when  there  is  ily  after  the  marriage.  The  additional
cost, including  administrative  costs?  'leakage"  to another  group.  dowry  is often  paid  to stop the  husband
Armed  with  the  above  information,  Easterly  links  the existence  of a middle  from systematically  beating  the wife.
policymakers  should  be  in  a  position  to  class  consensus  to  exogenous  country  Bloch and Rao base their  case study  of
design a subsidy program  that  reaches  the  characteristics  such  as  resource  endow-  three  villages in southern  India  on quali-
intended  beneficiaries, provides them with  ments,  along the lines  of the  provocative  tative  and survey data.  Based on the eth-
the level offinancial support that  is strictly  thesis of Engerman  and Sokoloff 1997 that  nographic  evidence,  they  develop  a
necessary, meets the overall budget restric-  tropical  commodity  exporters  are  more  noncooperative  bargaining  and signaling
tions,  and  does  not  waste  an  excessive  unequal  than  other  societies.  model  of dowries  and  domestic  violence.
amount of funding on administrative  costs.  Easterly  confirms  this hypothesis  with  They test the predictions  from those mod-
This paper  - a product  of the Finance,  cross-country  data. This makes  it possible  els on survey  data.
Private  Sector, and Infrastructure  Sector  to  use  resource  endowments  as  instru-  They  find  that  women  whose  families
Unit,  Latin  America  and  the  Caribbean  ments  for inequality.  pay smaller  dowries  suffer increased  risk
Region - is part  of a larger  effort in the  A higher  share  of income for the middle  of marital  violence.  So  do  women  who
region  to evaluate  and  disseminate  les-  class  and  lower  ethnic  polarization  are  come  from  richer  families  (from  whom
sons of experience  in designing  policies to  empirically  associated  with  higher  in-  resources  can  more  easily  be extracted).
improve the quality  and sustainability  of  come,  higher  growth,  more  education,  Larger  dowries  - as well  as greater  sat-
infrastructure  services and to enhance  the  better  health,  better  infrastructure,  bet-  isfaction  with  the  marriage  (in the  form
access of the poor to these  basic  services.  ter  economic policies, less  political  insta-  of more male children)  - reduce the prob-
Copies of the paper are available  free from  bility, less civil war (putting  ethnic minori-  ability  of violence.
the  World  Bank,  1818  H  Street  NW,  ties at risk),  more social "modernization,"  In  India  marriage  is  almost  never  a
Washington,  DC  20433.  Please  contact  and  more democracy.  matter  of choice for women,  but is driven
Silvia  Delgado,  room  15-196,  telephone  This  paper  - a product  of Macroeco-  almost entirelyby  social norms and paren-
202-473-7840,  fax  202-676-1821,  email  nomics  and  Growth,  Development  Re-  tal  preferences.  Providing  opportunities
address  sdelgado@worldbank.org.  Policy  search  Group  - is part  of a larger  effort  for  women  outside  of marriage  and  the
Research Working Papers  are also posted  in the group to study the determinants  of  marriage  market  would significantly  im-
on  the  Web  at  www.worldbank.org/re-  growth.  Copies of the paper  are available  prove  their  well-being  by allowing  them
search/workingpapers.  The authors  may  free from the  World Bank,  1818 H Street  to leave an abusive  husband,  or find a way
be contacted  at vfosteraworldbank.org  or  NW, Washington,  DC 20433.  Please  con-  of  "bribing"  him  to  stop  the  abuse,  or
jhalpern@worldbank.org.  (35 pages)  tact  Kari  Labrie,  room  MC3-456,  tele-  present  a credible  threat,  which  has  the
phone  202-473-1001,  fax  202-522-3518,  same  effect.
email  address  klabrie@worldbank.org.  This paper  - a product  of Poverty  and
2346. The Middle  Class Consensus  Policy Research  Working  Papers  are also  Human  Resources,  Development  Re-
and Economic  Development  posted onthe  Web at www.worldbank.orgl  search  Group  - is part  of a larger  effort
research/workingpapers.  The author  may  in the group to examine  crime and violence
William Easterly  be contacted  at weasterly@worldbank.org.  in developing  countries.  Copies of the pa-
(May 2000)  (41 pages)  per  are  available  free  from  the  World
Bank,  1818 H Street NW, Washington,  DC
A  higher  share  of income for  the middle  20433.  Please  contact  Patricia  Sader,
class and  lower  ethnic  polarization  are  2347. Terror  as a Bargaining  room MC3-556, telephone  202-473-3902,
empirically associated with higher income,  Instrument:  A Case  Study  of Dowry  fax 202-522-1153,  email  address  psader
higher  growth,  more  education,  better  Violence  in Rural India  @worldbank.org.  Policy Research  Work-
health,  better  infrastructure,  better eco-  ing Papers  are  also posted  on the Web at
nomic policies,  less political  instability,  Francis Bloch and Vijayendra Rao  w w w.  world  bank.  org/research  /
less civil war (putting  ethnic  minorities  at  (May 2000)  workingpapers.  Vijayendra  Rao  may  be
risk),  more  social  "modernization,"  and  contacted  at  vrao@worldbank.org.  (29
more democracy.  Some aspectsofviolent  behaviorare  linked  pages)
to economic  incentives  and  deserve  more
Modern  political  economy  stresses  attention  from  economists.  In  India,  for
"society's  polarization"  as a determinant  example,  domestic  violence is  used  as a  2348.  Taxing Issues  with
of development  outcomes. Amongthe  most  bargaining  instrument,  to extract  larger  Privatization:  A Checklist
common forms of social conflict are class  dowries from a wife'sfamily,  after the mar-
polarization  and ethnic  polarization.  riage has taken  place.  Jack M. Mintz, Duanjie Chen,
A middle class  consensus  is defined  as  and Evangelia Zorotheos
a high share  of income for the middle class  Bloch and Rao examine  how domestic vio-  (May 2000)
and a low degree of ethnic  polarization.  A  lence may be used as a bargaining  instru-
middle  class consensus  distinguishes  de-  ment,  to extract  larger  dowries  from  a  The literature  on privatization  has  over-
velopment  successes  from failures.  spouse's  family.  The  phrase  'dowry  vio-  looked how the tax status  of the company
A  theoretical  model  shows  how  lence" refers  not to the dowry paid at  the  to be privatized  will  affect the firm's,  and
groups-  distinguished  by  class  or  time  of the  wedding,  but  to  additional  the country's,  financial  transition.Policy  Research  Working  Paper  Series  21
Privatization has been a popular strategy  2349.  Trade,  Foreign  Direct  vest directly in countries where such pro-
for improving efficiency in both market  Investment,  and  International  tections are  weak, or will not invest in
and transition economies. The literature  Technology  Transfer:  A Survey  manufacturing and research and develop-
on privatization  includes broad  discus-  ment  activities.  Policy on  intellectual
sions of pricing techniques but overlooks  Kamal  Saggi  property rights  also influences whether
tax issues.  (May  2000)  technology transfer comes  through licens-
In reality, a state-owned company  loses  ing, joint ventures,  or the establishment
its privilege of paying no taxes once it is  How much a developing  country can take  of wholly owned subsidiaries.
privatized.  This  change  in  tax  status  advantage of technology  transferfrom for-  This paper - a product of Trade, De-
would certainly complicate the financial  eign direct investment depends partly on  velopment Research Group - is part of a
transition of a newly privatized company,  how well educated and  well trained  its  larger  effort  in  the  group  to  study
affect industrywide  economic efficiency,  workforce is,  how much it is willing to  microfoundations  of international technol-
and change the revenue pattern of  govern-  invest in research and development, and  ogy  diffusion.  The study was funded  by the
ments.  how much protection it offers for intellec-  Bank's Research Support Budget under
Using Ontario Hydro and the Canadian  tual property rights.  the research project "Microfoundations  of
tax regime as examples, Mintz, Chen, and  International Technology  Diffusion. Cop-
Zorotheos provide policymakers with  a  Saggi surveys the literature  on trade and  ies of  this paper are available free from the
checklist  on  tax  issues  under  foreign direct investment  - especially  World  Bank, 1818  H Street NW, Washing-
privatization. Their main observations:  wholly owned subsidiaries  of multina-  ton,  DC  20433.  Please  contact  Rina
* The tax status of the company to be  tional firms and international joint ven-  Bonfield, room MC3-354, telephone 202-
privatized must be considered in analyz-  tures  - 473-1248, fax  202-522-3518, email  ad-
ing the firm's financial transition.  as  channels for technology transfer.  He  dress  abonfield@worldbank.org. Policy
* The economic  efficiency targeted by  also discusses licensing and other arm's-  Research Working  Papers are also posted
privatization  may depend partly  on the  length channels oftechnology  transfer. He  on  the  Web  at  www.worldbank.org/re-
tax regime for a particular  industry.  concludes:  searchlworkingpapers. The author may be
PFrivatization  affects  government  rev-  *  How trade  encourages  growth  de-  contacted  at  ksaggi@mail.smu.edu. (45
enue through the revenue-sharing  struc-  pends on whether knowledge spillover is  pages)
ture  determined  by  intergovernmental  national  or  international.  Spillover  is
fiscal relationships  and cross-border tax  more likely to be national for developing
arrangements.  countries than for industrial countries.  2350. Multilateral  Trade
Time is a factor in tax and  transition  * Local  policy  often makes pure foreign  Liberalization,  Political
issues. At the time of privatization,  for  direct investment  infeasible,  so foreign  Disintegration,  and  the Choice  of
example, how are assets to be valued for  firms choose licensing or joint ventures.  Free  Trade  Areas  versus  Customs
calculating capital gains and cost deduc-  The jury is still out on whether licensing  Unions
tions, for tax  purposes? Are the  assets  orjoint ventures lead to more learning by
transferred  to the  new owners  at  fair  local firms.  Maurice  Schiff
market value, book value, or at cost, for  * Policies designed to attract  foreign  (May  2000)
tax  purposes?  How should heavy  debt  direct investment are proliferating.  Sev-
loads be treated?  eral plant-level studies have failed to find  Two  theories  are  combined  to  explain  whyfree
Ontario Hydro  will not be privatized but  positive spillover from foreign direct in-  trade areas (FTAs) have proliferated  more
it will become  taxable. How the taxes will  vestment to firms competing directly with  than customs unions (CUs)  have, and why
be paid will depend on how the transition  subsidiaries of multinationals. (However,  FTAs are found more  in North-South  agree-
is treated. Tax policy will be a key deter-  these studies treat foreign direct invest-  ments and CUs in South-South  agreenents.
minant of the industry's  future develop-  ment as exogenous and assume spillover
ment.  to be horizontal - when it may be verti-  Schiff combines two theories - one about
This paper - a product of the Gover-  cal.) All such studies do find the subsid-  how multilateral  trade  liberalization af-
nance, Regulation, and Finance Division,  iaries ofmultinationals to  be more produc-  fects regional integration, the other about
World  Bank Institute  -is  part of a larger  tive than domestic firms, so foreign direct  how it affects political  disintegration -to
effort in the institute  to increase under-  investment does result  in host countries  explain why the ratio of free trade areas
standing  of  infrastructure  regulation.  using resources more effectively.  to customs unions has increased over  time,
Copies  of the paper are available free from  *  Absorptive capacity in the host coun-  and why it is larger in North-South than
the  World Bank,  1818 H  Street  NW,  tryisessentialforgettingsignificantben-  in South-South agreements.
Washington,  DC 20433. Please contact  efitsfromforeigndirectinvestment.  With-  Ethier  (1998, 1999) argues that multi-
Gabriela  Chenet-Smith,  room  J3-147,  out adequate  human  capital  or invest-  lateral  trade liberalization led to the re-
telephone  202-473-6370, fax  202-676-  ments  in  research  and  development,  cent wave ofregional integration arrange-
9874, email address gchenet@worldbank.  spillover fails to materialize.  ments.
org. Policy  Research Working Papers are  * A country's  policy on protection of  Alesina and others (1997),  in discussing
also  posted  on  the  Web  at  www.  intellectual  property  rights  affects the  the number and size of countries, argue
worldbank.org/research/workingpapers.  type  of industry  it  attracts.  Firms  for  that  multilateral  trade  liberalization
(39 pages)  which  such rights  are  crucial  (such as  leads to political disintegration, with an
pharmaceutical firms) are unlikely to in-  increase in the number of countries.22  Policy  Research  Working  Paper  Series
Combining the  two arguments,  Schiff  But the ongoing incentives created by  w w w. w o r l  d b a n k. o rg/re  s e a rc h/
hypothesizes that  as multilateral  trade  market-based instruments are not neces-  workingpapers. Benoit Laplante may be
liberalization proceeds  and the number of  sarily right, either. Time-consistency  con-  contacted  at  blaplante@worldbank.org.
regional  integration  arrangements  in-  straints  on the  setting of these instru-  (42 pages)
creases, the  ratio of free trade  areas to  ments limit the regulator's ability to set
customs unions also increases. The same  policies  that lead to efficiency  in adopting
arguments are also used to show  why that  technology options.  2352.  How  Stronger  Patent
ratio  is larger  in  North-South  than  in  After examining the  time-consistency  Protection  in India  Might  Affect
South-South  agreements. The  data, which  properties of a  Pigouvian emissions tax  the  Behavior  of  Transnational
show that  ratio increasing in the  1990s  and of emissions trading, Kennedy and  Pharmaceutical  Industries
and larger for North-South agreements,  Laplante find that:
are consistent with the hypotheses.  *  Ifdamageis linear, efficiency  in adopt-  Carsten  Fink
Finally, a number of voluntary and in-  ing  technologies  involves  either universal  (May  2000)
voluntary customs unions are examined  adoption  of the new technology or univer-
where weaker members lose and conflict  sal  retention of the old technology, de-  How will stronger patent rights in devel-
does or does not take place,  and where free  pending on the cost of adoption. The first-  oping  countries  affect transnational  corpo-
trade agreements are superior.  best tax policy and the first-best permit-  rations'  behavior in  and  toward  those
This  paper  - a product  of Trade,  De-  supply  policy  are  both  time-consistent  countries?How  will market structure  and
velopment Research Group - is part of a  under these conditions.  consumer  welfare be affected by extending
larger effort in the group to study regional  * If damage is strictly convex,  efficiency  patent protection to products that could
integration. Copies  ofthe paper are avail-  may require partial adoption of the new  previously  be freely  imitated?  Will re-
able free from the World Bank, 1818 H  technology.  In this case, the first-best tax  search-based transnational corporations
Street  NW,  Washington,  DC  20433.  policy is not time-consistent and the tax  devote more resources  to developing tech-
Please contact Lili Tabada, room MC3-  rate must be adjusted after adoption has  nologies relevant to needs in developing
333,  telephone 202-473-6896,  fax 202-522-  taken place (ratcheting). Ratcheting will  countries?
1159,  email address ltabada@worldbank.  induce an efficient equilibrium if there is
org. Policy  Research Working Papers are  a very large number of firms. If there are  To address questions about how stronger
also  posted  on  the  Web  at  www.  relativelyfew  firms, ratcheting creates too  patent  rights will affect India's pharma-
worldbank.org/research/workingpapers.  many incentives  to adopt the new  technol-  ceutical industry, Fink simulates the ef-
The author may be contacted at mschiff  ogy.  fects of introducing such protection - as
@worldbank.org.  (23 pages)  * The first-best supply policy is time-  required by the World`Trade  Organization
consistent if there is a very large number  Agreement on Trade-Related Intellectual
of firms. If there are relatively few firms,  Property  Rights  (TRIPs) - on market
2351.  Environmental  Policy  and  the first-best  supply policy may not be  structure  and  static  consumer welfare.
Time  Consistency:  Emissions  time-consistent, and the regulator must  (India must amend its current patent re-
Taxes  and  Emissions  Trading  ratchet  the supply of permits. With this  gime by 2005 and establish a transitional
policy,  there are not enough incentives  for  regime in the meanwhile.)
Peter  W.  Kennedy  and Benoit  Laplante  firms to adopt the new technology.  The model Fink uses accounts for the
(May  2000)  The results  do not strongly favor one  complex demand structure  for pharma-
policyinstrument over  the other, but ifthe  ceutical  goods. Consumers  can  choose
As instruments for controlling pollution,  point of an emissions trading program is  among various drugs available to treat a
how do emissions taxes and  emissions  to increase technological efficiency, it is  specific disease. And for each drug, they
trading compare  in terms of  the incentives  necessary to continually adjust the sup-  have a choice among various differenti-
they create  to adopt cleaner technologies?  ply of permits in response to technologi-  ated brands.
Emissions taxes may have a slight ad van-  cal change, even when damage is linear.  Fink calibrates the model  for two  groups
tage over emissions trading.  This continual adjustment is not needed  of drugs  - quinolonnes  and  synthetic
for an emissions tax when damage is lin-  hypotensives - using 1992 brand-level
Kennedy and  Laplante  examine policy  ear, which may give emissions taxes an  data. In both groups, a subset of all avail-
problems related  to the use of emissions  advantage over emissions trading.  able drugs was patent-protected in West-
taxes and emissions trading, two market-  This paper - a product of Infrastruc-  erm Europe but not India, where Indian
based inistruments for controlling pollu-  ture and Environment, Development Re-  manufacturers  freely imitated them.
tion by getting regulated firms to adopt  search Group - is part of a larger effort  The simulation analysis asks how the
cleaner technologies. By attaching an ex-  in the  group to study the  economics of  market  structure  for the  two groups of
plicit price  to emissions, these  instru-  pollution control. Copies of the paper are  drugs  would have  looked if India  had
ments give firms an incentive to continu-  available free from the World Bank, 1818  granted patents for drugs. It does not take
ally reduce their volume of emissions.  H  Street  NW, Washington,  DC 20433.  account of the fact that  stronger patent
Command-and-control  emissions stan-  Please  contact  Yasmin  D'Souza, room  protection  will not apply to existing  drugs
dardscreateincentivestoadoptcleanertech-  MC2-622, telephone  202-473-1449, fax  and that the Indian government might be
nologies  only  up to the point  where the stan-  202-522-3230, email  address  ydsouza  able to restrain high drug prices  by impos-
dards are no longer  binding  (at which point  @worldbank.org.  Policy Research Work-  ing price controls or granting compulsory
the shadow  price  on emissions  falls  to zero).  ing Papers are also posted on the Web at  licenses.Policy Research Working Paper Series  23
Still,  Fink concludes  that  iffuture  drug  With  roughly  16,000  buses  fighting  2354.  When  the  Bureaucrats  Move
discoveries are mainly new varieties  of  theirwaythrough  heavy  traffic undertraf-  out of Business: A Cost-Benefit
already  existing  therapeutic  treatments,  fic policies geared to automobiles,  bus ser-  Assessment  of Labor
the effect of stronger  patent  protection  is  vice was  slow and  unreliable.  Then  Sao  Retrenchment  in China
likely  to  be  small.  If  newly  discovered  Paulo  adopted  certain  practices  aimed  at
drugs  are medicinal  breakthroughs,  how-  improving  bus  operations.  Between  1983  Yi Chen and Ishac Diwan
ever,  prices  may  rise  significantly  above  and  1987, it  implemented  a segregated  (May 2000)
competitive  levels  and  static  welfare  trolleybus  corridor  between  Sao  Mateus
losses  may be large.  andJabaquara,  tobe operated  as a private  Reformers  of  China's  state  enterprises
If demand  is highly  price-elastic,  as is  concession  regulated  by the  state  of Sao  should  realize  that more could be realized
likely  in India,  profits  for transnational  Paulo.  from capital  transfer  than  is beinggained
corporations  are likely  to be small.  But  if  The  concession  was  to  operate  for 20  from  labor  retrenchment.  And  more  effi-
private  health  insurance  is permitted  in  years  but the winning  consortium  had to  cient  capital  allocation,  by  reducing  the
India,  reducing  the price-sensitivity  of de-  invest  in only part  of the  equipment,  be-  pressure  on  labor,  would  bring  larger
mand,  patent-holders'  profits  could  in-  cause  part  of it was in place.  This  made  gains  at a lower social cost.
crease substantially.  In light ofthe fact that  things  less  risky  for the  private  consor-
the TRIPS Agreement  strengthens  patent  tium  and allowed the state  to complete an  Chen  and  Diwan  estimate  the  costs  and
rights  in most  developing countries,  phar-  environmentally  friendly  project with the  benefits  of labor  retrenchment  in  state-
maceutical  companies  may  do  more  re-  help of the  private  sector.  The concession  owned  industrial  enterprises  in  China.
search on, for example,  tropical  diseases.  has so far been a success  - an example  to  Their  results  indicate  the  prevalence  of
This  paper  - a product  of Trade,  De-  be followed.  low and  stagnant  labor  productivity,  low
velopment  Research  Group  - is part  of a  After an initial  increase,  demand  for the  capital  productivity,  and excessively  high
larger effort in the group to investigate  the  busway  began  to fall in  1998 and  1999.  wages  in  the  state  sector  for the  period
economic  consequences  of  multilateral  This  was part  of a general  decline  in de-  reviewed  (1994-97).
trade agreements.  Copies of the paper  are  mand  for the  bus system  because  of:  The  private  sector  exhibited  consis-
available  free from the World Bank,  1818  *  A drop in jobs resulting  from the eco-  tently  greater  productivity.
H  Street  NW,  Washington,  DC  20433.  nomic slowdown.  The  authors'  most  striking  finding:  A
Please  contact  Lili  Tabada,  room  MC3-  *  A growth  in the use of automobiles.  greater  gain  could be realized  from  capi-
333, telephone  202-473-6896, fax 202-522-  *  Competition  from  illegal  buses  tal transfer  than  is being  gained  from la-
1159, email address  ltabadaCworldbank.  (vans),  which offer door-to-door  service.  bor retrenchment.
org. Policy Research  Working  Papers  are  The  state  was  late  in  completing  the  Their  simulation  results  for  1996 esti-
also  posted  on  the  Web  at  www.  aerial  network  for the trolleyway  and re-  mate  that  43 percent  of the  workers  in
worldbank.org/research/workingpapers.  habilitating  sections of the roadway.  This  state  enterprises  and  70 percent  of the
The  author  may  be  contacted  at  cfink  delayed  replacement  of diesel  buses  by  capital  are redundant.  By itself,  a trans-
@worldbank.org.  (45 pages)  trolleybuses.  State  representatives  indi-  fer of labor  from  the public  to the private
cated it might be better  in future  to find a  sector  at  the  current  magnitude  (20 per-
mechanism  through  which the concession-  cent of the labor  force) would  secure  only
2353.  The Sio  Mateus-Jabaquara  aire  instead  of the state  would undertake  2 percent  gains in output.  Atransfer  of 10
Trolleybusway  Concession  in  infrastructure  works  and  would  also  percent  of both  capital  and  labor  would
Brazil  handle  administration  of integration  ter-  achieve  a  greater  efficiency  gain  than
minals.  transferring  the full 43 percent  of redun-
Jorge Rebelo and Pedro Machado  This paper  - a product  of the Finance,  dant  workers.  This is partly  because  the
(May 2000)  Private  Sector, and Infrastructure  Sector  private  sector uses capital  more efficiently
Unit,  Latin  America  and  the  Caribbean  than  the public  sector  and partly  because
To replace a diesel  bus  busway  operated  Region  - is part  of a larger  effort in the  it  needs  capital  to  hire  workers  trans-
under a management  contract by the state  region to promote private  sector operation  ferred  from  the public  sector.
with an electric trolley busway,  Sdo Paulo  and investment  in transport.  Copies ofthe  Their  results  suggest  that  reform  in
State in Brazil  designed and implemented  paper  are  available  free  from the  World  state  enterprises  should concentrate  more
a concession to the private  sector. Accord-  Bank, 1818 HStreetNW,  Washington,  DC  on the  efficiency of capital  allocation,  not
ing  to independent  user  surveys,  service  20433.  Please  contact  Solange  Van  just  on labor retrenchment.  More efficient
under the concession has been satisfactory.  Veldhuizen,  room 15-002, telephone  202-  capital  allocation  would  reduce  the  pres-
473-8722,  fax  202-676-9594,  email  ad-  sure on labor and would bringlarger  gains
Rebelo  and  Machado  describe  how  Sao  dress  svanveldhuizen@worldbank.org.  at  a lower  social cost.
Paulo  State  granted  a 20-year  concession  Policy Research  Working  Papers  are  also  This paper  - a product  ofthe  Economic
for operating  a busway,  one requirement  posted on the Web at www.worldbank.org/  Policy  and  Poverty  Reduction  Division,
for which was that  the concessionaire  re-  research/workingpapers.  Jorge  Rebelo  World Bank  Institute-is  part  of a larger
place  the  diesel bus  operation  with  elec-  may  be contacted  at jrebelo@worldbank.  effort  in the  institute  to study  the  archi-
tric  traction  (trolleys).  This  was  not  a  org. (12 pages)  tecture  of reform.  Copies of the paper  are
"greenfield concession" but is probably the  available  free from the World Bank,  1818
only "busway"  concession  undertaken  so  H  Street  NW,  Washington,  DC  20433.
far worldwide.  Please  contact  Mona Yafi,  room J4-158,24  Policy  Research  Working  Paper  Series
telephone  202-473-4649, fax  202-676-  poras to finance further conflict.  The point  inevitably a political choice, and  can be
9810, email address  myafi@worldbank.  of policy  intervention here is to reduce the  reversed, contend Keefer and Stasavage.
org. Policy  Research Working Papers are  absolute  and  relative  attraction  of pri-  They  develop  a model  ofmonetary policy
also  posted  on  the  Web  at  www.  mary commodity  predation and to reduce  that  relaxes  the  assumption  that  mon-
worldbank.org/research/workingpapers.  the ability ofdiasporas to fund rebel move-  etary  delegation is irreversible. Among
The  authors  may  be  contacted  at  ments.  the testable predictions of the model are
ychen@dol.eta.gov  or idiwan@worldbank.  This paper - a product of the Develop-  these:
org. (39 pages)  ment Research  Group  - is part of  a larger  *  The presence of an independent cen-
effort in the group to study civil war and  tral bank should reduce inflation only in.
criminal violence. For more on this effort,  the presence of political checks and bal-
2355. Greed and Grievance  go to www.worldbank.org/research/con-  ances. This  effect  should  be evident in both
in Civil War  flict. Copies  ofthe paper are available free  developing and industrial countries.
from the World  Bank, 1818  H Street NW,  * Political actions to interfere with the
Paul  Collier  and Anke  Hoeffler  Washington, DC 20433. Please contact  central  bank  should be more apparent
(May  2000)  Audrey Kitson-Walters, room MC3-527,  when there are few checks and balances.
telephone  202-473-3712,  fax  202-522-  *  The  effects  of checks  and  balances
Of the 27 major armed conflicts that oc-  1150,  email  address  akitsonwalters  should be  more marked  when political
curred in  1999, all but  two took place  @worldbank.org.  Policy Research Work-  decisionmakers are more polarized.
within national boundaries.  As an impedi-  ing Papers are also posted on the Web at  The authors test these predictions and
ment to development, internal rebellion  w w w. world  bank.  org/research/  find extensive empirical evidence  to sup-
especially  hurts the world's poorest coun-  workingpapers. Paul Collier may be con-  port each of the observable implications
tries. What motivates civil wars? Greed  or  tacted  at  pcollier@worldbank.org. (44  of their model: Central banks are associ-
grievance?  pages)  ated with better inflation outcomes in the
presence  of checks  and balances. The  turn-
Collier  and Hoeffler  compare two  contrast-  over of central bank governors is reduced
ing motivations for rebellion: greed and  2356. Bureaucratic Delegation  when governors have tenure protections
grievance. Most  rebellions are ostensibly  and Political Institutions:  When  supported  by political checks and  bal-
in pursuit of a cause, supported by a nar-  Are Independent  Central Banks  ances. And the effect of checks and bal-
rative of grievance. But  since grievance  Irrelevant?  ances is enhanced in more polarized po-
assuagement through rebellion is a pub-  litical environments.
lic good that  a government will not sup-  Philip  Keefer  and David  Stasavage  This paper - a product of Regulation
ply, economists predict  such rebellions  (June  2000)  and  Competition  Policy, Development
would be rare.  Research Group - is part of a larger ef-
Empirically,  many rebellions appear to  Does delegation of policymaking author-  fort in the group to identify the conditions
be linked to the capture of resources (such  ity to independent agencies  improvepolicy  under which regulatory  reforms can be
as diamonds in Angola and Sierra Leone,  outcomes?  This paper reports new theory  effective.  Copies  of the paper are available
drugs in Colombia,  and timber in Cambo-  and tests  related to delegation  of monetary  free from the World Bank, 1818 H Street
dia) Collier and Hoeffler set up a simple  policy to an independent  central bank. The  NW, Washington, DC 20433. Please con-
rational choice model of greed-rebellion  authors  find that delegation reduces  infla-  tact Paulina Sintim-Aboagye,  room MC3-
and contrast its predictions with those of  tion only under specific  institutional and  422,  telephone 202-473-7644,  fax  202-522-
a simple grievance model.  political conditions.  1155,  email  address  psintimaboagye
Some  countries  return to conflict  repeat-  @worldbank.org. Policy Research Work-
edly. Are they conflict-prone  or is there a  The government's ability to credibly com-  ing Papers are also posted on the Web at
feedback  effect  whereby conflict  generates  mit to policy  announcements is critical to  w w w .w o r 1  d b a n k .o r g/ r e s e a r c h/
grievance,  which  in turn generates further  the  successful  implementation  of  eco-  workingpapers. The authors may be con-
conflict? The authors  show why such a  nomic policies as diverse as capital taxa-  tacted  at  pkeefer@worldbank.org  or
feedback effect might be present in both  tion  and  utilities  regulation.  One  fre-  d.stasavage@lse.ac.uk.  (48 pages)
greed-motivated  and grievance  rebellions.  quently  advocated means  of  signaling
The authors' results contrast with con-  credible commitment is to delegate  au-
ventional beliefs about the causes of con-  thority to an agency that will not have an  2357. Evaluating  Carbon Offsets
flict. A stylized version of conventional  incentive  to opportunistically  change poli-  from Forestry and Energy Projects:
beliefs would be that  grievance begets  cies  once  the private sectorhas taken such  How Do They Compare?
conflict, which begets grievance, which  steps as signing wage contracts or mak-
begets  further conflict.  With such a model,  ing irreversible investments.  Kenneth  M. Chomitz
the only  point at which to intervene is to  Delegating authority is suggested as a  (June  2000)
reduce the level of objective  grievance.  government  strategy particularlyfor mon-
Collier and Hoeffler's model suggests  etary  policy. And existing work on the  Under  the Clean  Development  Mechanism,
that what actually happens is that oppor-  independence of central banks generally  developing countries will be able to pro-
tunitiesforpredation (controllingprimary  assumes  that  government decisions to  duce  certified emissions  reductions  (CERs,
commodity  exports)  cause conflict  and the  delegate are irrevocable. But delegation  sometimes  called  'offsets)  through
grievances this  generates  induce dias-  - in monetary policy as elsewhere - is  projects that reduce greenhouse  gas emis-Policy  Research  Working  Paper  Series  25
sions below business-as-usual  levels. The  describes various approaches to ensure  They find that  these facilities have of-
challenges  of setting up offset  markets are  permanence or adjust credits for  duration:  ten fallen short of their objectives  for two
considerable. Do forestry projects, as  a  the  ton-year approach (focusing on the  main sets of reasons. First, the environ-
class, have more difficulty  than energy  benefits from deferring climatic damage,  ment was not conducive  to private partici-
projects reducing greenhouse gas emis-  and rewarding longer deferral); the com-  pation in infrastructure  because of poor
sions in ways that are real, measurable,  bination approach  (bundling current land  sector  policies, an  unstable  macroeco-
additional, and consistent with sustain-  use change and forestry emissions reduc-  nomic environment, and  inadequate  fi-
able development?  tions with future reductions in the buyer's  nancial sector policies,  among other rea-
allowed amount); a technology-accelera-  sons. Second, the facility was faulty in
Under the Kyoto  Protocol,  industrial coun-  tion  approach;  and  an  insurance  ap-  design - in terms  of sectors targeted,
tries  accept caps on their  emissions of  proach.  pricing of  instruments, and consistency  of
greenhouse gases. They are permitted to  This paper - a product of Infrastruc-  objectives and instruments.
acquire  offsetting emissions reductions  ture and Environment, Development  Re-  This paper - a product of Private Par-
fromdeveloping  countries-which  do not  search Group - is part of a larger effort  ticipation in Infrastructure, Private Sec-
have emissions limitations - to assist in  in the group to assess policies  for mitigat-  tor Development Department - is part of
complying  with these caps. Because these  ing climate change.  Copies  of  the paper are  a larger effort in the department to exam-
emissions reductions are defined against  available free from the World  Bank, 1818  ine government  policies  in infrastructure.
a hypothetical baseline, practical issues  H  Street  NW, Washington, DC 20433.  Copies  of  the paper are available free  from
arise in ensuring that the reductions are  Please  contact  Joseph  Ancrum,  room  the  World Bank,  1818 H  Street  NW,
genuine. Forestry-related emissions re-  MC2-522, telephone 202473-3512,  fax  Washington, DC 20433. Please contact
duction  projects  are  often  thought  to  202-522-3230, email  address  jancrum  Mina Salehi,  room  I10-118, telephone  202-
present  greater difficulties in measure-  @worldbank.org.  Policy Research Work-  473-7157, fax  202-522-2029, email  ad-
ment and implementation than  energy-  ing Papers are also posted on the Web at  dress msalehi@worldbank.org.  Policy  Re-
related emissions reduction projects.  w w w .w o rl db a n k. o r g/ r e s e a r c h/  search Working  Papers are also posted on
Chomitz discusses how project charac-  workingpapers. The author may be con-  the Web  at www.worldbank.org/research/
teristics affect the process for determin-  tacted  at kchomitz@worldbank.org.  (25  workingpapers. Daniela Klingebiel may
ing compliance  with each ofthe criteria for  pages)  be contacted at  dklingebiel@worldbank.
qualifying. Those criteria are:  org. (38 pages)
* Additionality. Would the  emissions
reductions not have taken place without  2358. Why Infrastructure  Financing
the project?  Facilities  Often Fall Short of Their  2359. Reducing Carbon Dioxide
* Baseline  and  systems  boundaries  Objectives  Emissions  through Joint
(leakage).  What would business-as-usual  Implementation  of Projects
emissions have been without the project?  Daniela  Klingebiel  and Jeff Ruster
And in this comparison,  how  broad should  (June  2000)  Will Martin
spatial and temporal system boundaries  (June  2000)
be?  To  encourage  theprivate  funding andpro-
- Measurement (orsequestration).  How  vision of infrastructure services, govern-  Mostproposalsforjoint implementation  of
accurately can we measure actual with-  ments  have  used  specialized financing  energyprojects emphasize  installing more
project emissions levels?  facilities to offer financial support to in-  technically efficient capital equipment to
* Duration or permanence. Will the  vestors. A study of five cases shows that  allow reduced  energy  use for anygiven mix
projecthave  an enduring mitigatingeffect?  these facilities have often fallen short of  of input and output. But increases in en-
* Local impact.  Will the projectbenefit  their objectives,  for two main sets of rea-  ergy efficiency are likely to have second-
its neighbors?  sons. First, the environment was not con-  round effects. Reducing energy demand,
For all the criteria except permanence,  ducive to private participation  in infra-  for example, will reduce the market price
it is difficult to find generic distinctions  structure. And  second, the facility  was  of energy and stimulate energy use, par-
between land use change and forestry and  faulty in design.  tially offsetting the initial  reduction in
energy  projects, since  both categories  com-  demand. These effects  are likely to be sub-
prise diverse project types.  The important  To encourage the  private  funding  and  stantially larger in the long run, reducing
distinctions among projects have to do  provision of infrastructure  services, gov-  the magnitude of these  offsets.
with such things as:  ernments have used specialized financing
* The level  and  distribution  of the  facilities to offer financial support to in-  Efficient  reduction of  carbon dioxide  emis-
project's direct financial benefits.  vestors, often in the form of grants, soft  sions requires  coordination of interna-
* How much the project is integrated  loans, or guarantees.  tional efforts. Approaches proposed in-
with the larger system.  Klingebiel and  Ruster  present  case  clude carbon taxes, emission quotas, and
* The  project  components'  internal  studies of infrastructure  financing facili-  jointly implemented energy projects.
homogeneity and geographic dispersion.  ties in various stages of development in  To  reduce emissions efficiently  requires
* The  local replicability of  project  tech-  Colombia,  India, and Pakistan. They also  equalizing  the marginal costs of  reduction
nologies.  present case studies of government-spon-  between countries. The apparently large
Permanence is an issue specific  to land  sored financing  facilities (not  ofinfrastruc-  differentials between the costs of reduc-
use change and forestry projects. Chomitz  ture) in Argentina and Moldova.  ing emissions in industrial and develop-26  Policy Research Working  Paper Series
ing countries  implies  a great potential  for  2360. Corruption  and the  countries,  they  are  not  less  likely  than
lowering  the costs of reducing  emissions  Composition  of Foreign  Direct  firms  from  other  countries  to undertake
by  focusing  on  projects  in  developing  Investment: Firm-Level  Evidence  foreign  direct  investment  in those  coun-
countries.  tries.
Most proposals forjoint  implementation  Beata K. Smarzynska and Shang-Jin Wei  This  paper  - a joint  product  of Trade
of energy  projects  emphasize  installing  (June 2000)  and  Public Economics,  Development  Re-
more  technically  efficient  capital  equip-  search  Group  - is part  of a larger  effort
ment, to allow reductions  in energy use for  The extent  of corruption  in a host country  in the group to study  the effects of corrup-
any  given  mix of input  and  output.  But  affects a foreign direct investor's  choice of  tion  on economic  activity.  Copies  of the
such  increases  in efficiency are likely  to  investing  through  a  joint  venture  or  paper  are  available  free  from the  World
have potentially  important  second-round  through  a wholly owned  subsidiary.  Cor-  Bank, 1818 H Street  NW, Washington,  DC
impacts:  ruption reduces inwardforeign  investment  20433.  Please  contact  Hedy  Sladovich,
* Lowering  the relative  effective  price  and shifts the ownership  structure  toward  room MC2-609, telephone  202-473-7698,
of specific energy  products.  joint  ventures.  fax  202-522-1154,  . email  address
*  Lowering the price of energy  relative  hsladovich@worldbank.org.  Policy  Re-
to other  inputs.  Smarzynska  and Wei study  the impact  of  search  Working Papers  are also posted on
*  Lowering  the  price  of energy-inten-  corruption  in  a host  country  on foreign  the Web at www.worldbank.org/research/
sive products  relative  to other  products.  investors'  preference  for a joint venture  or  workingpapers.  The authors  may be con-
Martin  explores  the  consequences  of  a wholly owned subsidiary.  tacted  at bsmarzynska@worldbank.org  or
these second-round  impacts  and suggests  Their  simple  model  highlights  a basic  swei@worldbank.org.  (23 pages)
ways to deal with them  in practical  joint-  tradeoffin  using local partners.  On the one
implementation  projects.  hand,  corruption  makes the local bureau-
For example,  the direct impact  of reduc-  cracy less transparent  and increases  the  2361. The Welfare Effects of
ing  the  effective  price  of a fuel  is to in-  value  of  using  a  local  partner  to  cut  Private Sector Participation  in
crease  consumption  of that  fuel.  Gener-  through  the bureaucratic  maze.  Guinea's Urban Water Supply
ally,  substitution  effects  also  reduce  the  On the other hand,  corruption  decreases
use of other fuels,  and the emissions  gen-  the  effective  protection  of an  investor's  George Clarke, Claude M6nard,
erated  from them.  intangible  assets  and  reduces  the  prob-  and Ana Maria Zuluaga
If the  fuel  whose  efficiency  is  being  ability that  disputes  between  foreign and  (June 2000)
improved  is already  the  least  emission-  domestic  partners  will  be  adjudicated
intensive,  the  combined  impact  of  fairly,  which  reduces  the value  of having  Private  sector participation  in  Guinea's
these  price  effects  is  most  likely  to  be  a local partner.  urban  water sector has benefited consum-
favorable.  As the  investor's  technological  sophis-  ers, the government,  and,  to a lesser extent,
If the fuel whose efficiency is being im-  tication increases,  so does the importance  the new foreign  owners. Performance  will
proved  is initially  the  most  emission-in-  of protecting  intangible  assets, which tilts  improve further when the government starts
tensive,  the  combined  impact  of  these  the preference  away  from joint  ventures  paying  its own water bill on time and when
price changes is less likely to be favorable  in a corrupt  country.  the legislature  authorizes  the collection of
and may even increase  emissions.  Empirical  tests  of this  hypothesis  on  unpaid  bills from private  consumers.
In the example Martin  uses, increase  in  firm-level  data  show that  corruption  re-
coal use efficiency was completely ineffec-  duces  inward  foreign  direct  investment  In 1989 the government  of Guinea enacted
tive  in  reducing  emissions  because  it  and shifts the ownership  structure  toward  far-reaching  reform  of its  water  sector,
resulted  in emission-intensive  coal being  joint  ventures.  Conditonal  on foreign  di-  which had been dominated  by a poorly run
substituted  for  less  polluting  oil  and  rect investment  taking  place, an increase  public  agency.  The government  signed  a
gas.  in corruption  from the level found in Hun-  lease contract  for operations  and mainte-
This  paper  -a  product  of Trade,  De-  gary to that  found in Azerbaijan  decreases  nance  with a private  operator,  making  a
velopment  Research  Group  - is part of a  the probability  of a wholly owned subsid-  separate  public enterprise  responsible  for
larger  effort in the  group  to understand  iary by 10 to 20 percent.  Technologically  ownership  of assets  and  investment.  Al-
key links between  trade  and the environ-  more  advanced  firms  are  less  likely  to  though  based  on a successful  model  that
ment.  Copies  of the  paper  are  available  engage  in joint  ventures,  however.  had operated  in Cote d'Ivoire  for nearly  30
free from the World Bank,  1818 H Street  Smarzynska  and Wei find  support  for  years,  the  reform  had  many highly  inno-
NW, Washington,  DC 20433.  Please  con-  the view that  U.S. firms are more  averse  vative  features.
tact  Lili  Tabada,  room  MC3-333,  tele-  tojointventuresin  corruptcountriesthan  Itis  being transplanted  to several  other
phone  202-473-6896,  fax  202-522-1159,  are  other  foreign  investors  - possibly  developing  countries,  so Clarke,  M6nard,
email  address  Itabada@worldbank.org.  because  ofthe  U.S. Foreign  Corrupt  Prac-  and  Zuluaga  evaluate  its  successes  and
Policy Research  Working  Papers  are also  tices  Act, which  stipulates  penalties  for  failures  in the early years  of reform.  They
posted on the Web atwww.worldbank.org/  executives  of U.S. companies  whose  em-  present  standard  performance  measures
researchlworkingpapers.  The author  may  ployees  or local partners  engage  in pay-  and results  from a cost-benefit  analysis  to
be contacted at wmartinl@worldbank.org.  ing bribes.  assess  reform's net effect on various stake-
(26 pages)  But although  U.S. companies  are more  holders  in the sector.
likely than  investors  from other countries  They  conclude  that,  compared  with
to retain  full ownership  offirms  in corrupt  what  might  have  been  expected  underPolicy Research Working  Paper Series  27
continued public ownership, reform ben-  Conakry,  Guinea,  whose deterioration
efited consumers, the government, and, to  since  independence  had become  critical  by
a lesser extent, the foreign owners or the  the  mid-1980s. Less than  40 percent  of
private operator.  Conakry's population had access  to piped
Most  sector  performance  indicators  water - low even by regional standards
improved,  but some problems remain. The  - and service was intermittent,  at best,
three most troublesome areas are water  for the few  who had connections.  The pub-
that  is unaccounted for (there  are many  lic agency in charge of the sector was in-
illegal connections and the quality of in-  efficient,  overstaffed,  and  virtually
frastructure is poor),  poor collection  rates,  insolvent.
and high prices.  In several ways, the reform introduced
The  weak  institutional  environment  to the sector in 1989  under a World  Bank-
makes it difficult to improve collection  led projectwas remarkable. It showed  that
rates, but the government  could  take some  even in a weak institutional environment,
steps  to correct the  problem. To begin  where contracts are hard to enforce and
with, it could pay its  own bills on time.  political interference is common,  private
Also, the legislature could authorize the  sector participation  can improve sector
collection of unpaid bills from private in-  performance.
dividuals.  M6nard and Clarke discuss the mecha-
This paper - a joint product of Public  nisms that  made progress possible and
Economics and Regulation and Competi-  identify factors that  inhibit  the positive
tion Policy,  Development Research Group  effects of reform.
- is part of a larger effort in the group to  Water has become very expensive, the
promote competition and private  sector  number of  connections has increased very
development.  The studywas fundedby the  slowly, and conflicts have developed be-
Bank's Research Support Budget under  tween SEEG (the private operator) and
the research project  'Institutions,  Politics,  SONEG (the state  agency). Among the
and Contracts: Private Sector Participa-  underlying problems:
tion in Urban Water Supply" (RPO 681-  * The lack ofstrong, stable institutions.
87).  Copies of  this paper are available free  * The lack of an independent  agency
from the World Bank, 1818  H Street NW,  capable of restraining  arbitrary  govern-
Washington, DC 20433. Please  contact  ment action, regulating the private opera-
Hedy  Sladovich, room  MC2-609, tele-  tor, and  enforcing contractual  arrange-
phone  202-473-7698, fax 202-522-1154,  ments.
email address hsladovich@worldbank.org.  * The lack of adequate conflict resolu-
Policy  Research Working Papers are also  tion mechanisms for contract disputes.
posted on the Web at www.worldbank.org/  * Weak administrative  capacity.
researchl/workingpapers.  The  authors  This paper - a joint product of Public
may be contacted at gclarke@worldbank.  Economics and Regulation and Competi-
org or menard@univ-parisl.fr. (40 pages)  tion Policy,  Development Research Group
- is part of a larger effort in the group to
promote competition and private  sector
2362. A Transitory Regime Water  development.  The studywas fundedby the
Supply in Conakry, Guinea  Bank's Research Support Budget under
the research project  "Institutions, Politics,
Claude  Menard  and George  Clarke  and Contracts: Private Sector Participa-
(June  2000)  tion in Urban Water Supply" (RPO 681-
87). Copies  of this paper are available free
In several ways, the reform introduced to  from the World Bank, 1818  H Street NW,
the water sector in Conakry, Guinea, in  Washington,  DC 20433. Please contact
1989 under a World Bank-led project was  Hedy Sladovich ,  room MC2-609, tele-
remarkable.  It showed that even in a weak  phone  202-473-7698, fax 202-522-1154,
institutional environment, where  contracts  email address hsladovich@worldbank.org.
are hard to enforce  and political interfer-  Policy  Research Working Papers are also
ence is common, private sector  participa-  posted on the Web  at www.worldbank.orgl
tion can improve sectorperformance. Why  research/workingpapers.  The  authors
did the sector improve as much as it did,  may  be  contacted  at  menard@univ-
and what has inhibited reform?  parisl.fr  or gclarke@worldbank.org. (52
pages)
Both consumers and the government ben-
efited from reform of the water system in